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SMITH, LYONS ESSAY PRIZE 
The Development of an International Patent Regime: 
Sound Legal Theory or Misguided Leap of Faith? 
Graham Flack* 
Proposals for the establishment of an international patent regime have occupied the 
attention of negotiators during the Uruguay Round of the GAIT. While considerable 
resources have been devoted to determining the details of such a regime, little attention 
has been focussed on the justifications for such a system. The analysis of the 
philosophical, economic, and political justifications for the establishment of an 
international patent regime concludes that all current philosophical justifications rely on 
perceived normative economic benefits. In addition, the economic benefits of 
international patent protection cannot be assessed on the basis of existing economic data. 
The push for international patent protection is the result of the blind application of 
political and economic power by industrialized countries, and not a rational 
determination of national or global interests. 
Les propositions pour l'etablissement d'un regime international de brevets Ont occupe 
!'attention des negociateurs pendant "l'Uruguay Round" du GAIT. Quoique 
enormement de ressources aient ete consacrees a la determination des details du regime, 
peu d'attention a ete portee aux justifications de creation d'un tel regime. l'analyse des 
justifications philosophiques, economiques, et politiques pour l 'etablissement d 'un 
regime de brevet international conclut que toutes les justifications philosophiques 
presentes sont basees sur des avantages normatifs economiques per9us. De plus, !es 
avantages economiques d'une protection internationale de brevet ne peuvent pas etre 
estimes a partir des donnees qui existent presentement. l'initiative pour une protection 
internationale de brevet est le resultat de !'application aveugle de pouvoirs politiques et 
economiques par les pays industrialises, et non pas une determination rationelle des 
interets nationaux ou globaux. 
* Dalhousie Law School, LL.B. anticipated 1993. 
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"You see," he went on after a pause, "it's as well to be provided for 
everything. That's the reason the horse has all those anklets round his 
feet." 
"But what are they for?" Alice asked in a tone of great curiosity. 
"To guard against the bite of sharks," the Knight replied. "It's an 
invention of my own." 
- The White Knight and Alice in Through the looking Glass. 1 
Law is a system of rules recognized by a community as binding. It is designed 
to serve the interests of the community, not to determine those interests. This is 
particularly true for international law where the sovereignty of nation-states 
permits the opting out of all but a select few peremptory norms.2 Thus, in 
determining whether efforts should be made to establish an international patent 
system, it is critical that the interests of each of the participating communities be 
examined. In Alice's terms, the question is whether we need international patent 
protection to foster the optimal level of shark protection for horses. 
This paper will focus on the philosophical, economic, and political 
underpinnings that should and will determine whether or not an international 
patent system is established. While detailed reference will be made to existing 
legal instruments and perceived difficulties with them, the paper will not focus 
on a clause-by-clause analysis of possible technical modifications to the existing 
legal regime that might create a more efficient of body law. The international 
patent system, despite its relatively long history, is at a stage where the members 
of the community cannot agree whether there should be a system of rules at all, 
let alone what the most efficient way of setting out those rules would be. As a 
result, it is critical that the underlying philosophical, economic, and political 
bases of an international patent system be examined. 
This paper is divided into five sections. The first consists of a brief 
discussion of what patents are and what is meant by the establishment of an 
international patent system. The second reviews in detail the existing 
multilateral patent instruments including the perceived difficulties with those 
instruments. The third examines the philosophical bases of both utilitarian and 
rights theories in justifying a domestic or international patent system. In the 
fourth, the economic costs and benefits of an international patent system, 
including transfer costs, are broken down in an effort to determine if economics 
1 Lewis Carroll, Little Alice Edition (London: MacMillan, 1988) at 149. 
2 These norms superseding the authority of domestic legislatures have been severely 
limited in interpretations by the International Court of Justice. See generally H. Kindred 
et al., International law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 4th ed., (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 1987); S.S. lotus (France v. Turkey) (1927), Ser. A. Vol. 2, No. 9, 
I, at 18-30; Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties (1969), I.L.M. 679, Arts 53, 64. 
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provides us with a normative decision on the establishment of an international 
patent system. Finally, the political underpinnings of domestic patent systems 
are examined in an effort to determine whether international political realities 
are likely to ensure the establishment of an international patent system, 
regardless of arguments for or against such a system. 
I intend to demonstrate that current dissatisfaction with the international 
patent regime is likely to result in the establishment of an international patent 
system under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in spite of 
the fact that there is insufficient economic data with which to judge the 
efficiency of such a system. Consequently, rather than focussing their resources 
on negotiating detailed terms of a potential GA TT agreement, the legal 
community should be fostering research in an effort to determine whether there 
are sound philosophical or economic bases on which to support or reject the 
establishment of an international patent regime. 
THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT 
Patents and inventors' certificates are the two forms of industrial property rights 
that have the common goal of fostering economic development through the 
encouragement of invention. Inventors' certificates provide a financial reward 
to the inventor in return for which the state obtains all rights to the invention. 
Although inventors' certificates were commonly used in Marxist societies, 
including China and the Soviet Union, the remarkable economic transformation 
in Marxist states led by Deng Xiaoping's reforms of China has resulted for the 
most part in the abandonment of inventors' certificates in favour of patents. 3 
Consequently, this paper focusses on patents as the most accepted means 
through which industrial property rights are protected.4 
The World Intellectual Property Organization defines a patent as: 
A legally enforceable right granted by virtue of a law to a 
person to exclude, for a limited time, others from certain acts 
in relation to a described new invention; the privilege is 
granted by a government authority as a matter of right to the 
3 See W.E. Beaumont, "The New Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC): 
Evidence of a Second 'Renaissance'?" (1986), 27 Idea 39; and D. B. Kay, "The Patent 
Law of the People's Republic of China in Perspective," (1985), 33 U.C.L.A. L.R. 331 for 
an account of the remarkable transformation in intellectual property protection in China 
with the introduction of the 1984 Patent Law. 
4 The Economics section of this paper will show that patents are not the only vehicle, nor 
are they necessarily the most efficient means, by which a societal goal of increased 
innovation can be met. 
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person who is entitled to apply for it and who fulfils the 
prescribed conditions."5 
In short, a patent grants a bundle of rights for inventions that meet certain tests. 
Both the rights and tests applied vary among the patent systems of different 
states. The rights granted to inventors range from sixteen to twenty years of 
monopoly protection in most industrialized countries to no protection in 
Afghanistan.6 The tests for patentability of a product also differ from country to 
country, but three broad tests are generally used. The first is that the invention 
be new. Inventors will not be rewarded with a patent for technology that is 
already in use or has been patented by someone else, even if they arrived at their 
invention without knowing of its existence. The second test is that the invention 
must be non-obvious. Even if the product is new, it will not be eligible for a 
patent if the invention would be obvious to a person skilled in the field in which 
the invention was made. The final test is that the invention be applicable in 
industry. 
In discussing the establishment of an international patent system, it would 
be easy to fall into the lawyer's trap of drafting appropriate provisions for patent 
rights and criteria through a comparison of existing domestic patent systems. 
However, as has already been noted, if this international patent law is to be 
reflective of the interests of the international community, it must be based on 
sound philosophical, economic, and political underpinnings. In order to provide 
a framework for discussion of these underpinnings, this paper examines the 
current push by industrialized countries for a harmonized international patent 
system that would establish minimum standards, both in terms of the scope of 
patent protection and in the duration of patent rights. Before examining the 
merits of such a system, existing international patent mechanisms and the 
pressures to reform them will be outlined. 
THE EXISTING MULTILATERAL PATENT INSTRUMENTS 
The Paris Convention 
Multilateral cooperation in the field of patent protection began in 1883 with 
fourteen nations signing the International Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (Paris Convention). The Convention protects a full range of 
intellectual property, including patents, utility models, industrial designs, and 
5 Quoted in United Nations, The role of the patent system in the transfer of technology to 
developing countries UNCTAD, 1975, UN DOC TD/B/398 [hereinafter The role of the 
patent system.] 
6 Ibid. at 54. 
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trademarks. The treaty remains the dominant international document in the field 
of patent protection and its paramountcy has only come to be challenged in the 
last two decades.7 Since 1967, the Paris Convention has been administered 
through the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) which is one of 15 
specialized agencies of the United Nations.8 By the beginning of 1990, the Paris 
Convention had 100 member states, with two-thirds of those states being 
developing countries.9 
The Convention has been revised on six occasions 10 and its key components 
with respect to patents can be divided into seven major areas. They are: equality 
of treatment, right of priority, independence of patent systems, right to import 
patented articles, compulsory licensing and revocation, right to special 
agreements, and enforcement. 
The pillar of the Convention is its guarantee of equality of treatment. 11 This 
clause requires member states to treat foreign and domestic patent applications 
in the same way and accord them the same rights. While individual countries 
are free to determine their own criteria and levels of patent protection, they must 
accord the same level of protection to foreigners and nationals. 
The second element of the Convention is the right of priority. 12 This gives 
the inventor a priority right of twelve months to file for protection in all member 
countries after having filed in one member country. This provision is designed 
to ensure that filing for protection in one country cannot be deemed to be 
publication for the purposes of determining whether or not protection may be 
obtained in other member countries. 
The third element of the Convention is the general right of each member 
state to maintain its own patent system. 13 This allows member states to set their 
own standards for determining the criteria to be met for patent protection, 
whether any products or processes may be excluded entirely from protection, 
and the duration of patent protection. 
The fourth element of the Convention is protection against measures to 
7 As shall be argued later, perceptions in some industrialized countries that the Paris 
Convention insufficiently protects patents has shifted the focus of international patent 
protection toward the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). 
8 A concise overview of the activities of WIPO can be found in WIPO: General 
Information (Geneva, United Nations, 1989). 
9 M. A. Leaffer, ed., International Treaties on Intellectual Property (Washington: BNA, 
1990) at 19. 
10 The most recent of these was the Stockholm revision of 1967. 
11 See Article 2(1 ). 
12 See Article 4(A)(I). 
13 See Article 4bis(I). 
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prevent the importation of patented articles. 14 This precludes member states 
from forfeiting a patent on the basis that the invention is being imported into the 
country. The article was designed to prevent member states from utilizing 
patent requirements as a non-tariff barrier that would force the production of 
each patented item in the country granting the patent. 
The fifth area of the Convention places limitations on the use of revocation 
and compulsory licensing in member states. 15 While there is a general freedom 
of states to control their patent system under article 4(1), they are prevented 
from granting compulsory licences until at least three years after the grant of the 
patent. Revocation is not permitted until at least two years after the granting of 
the first compulsory licence. 
The sixth major element of the Convention is found in article 19 which 
permits member states to enter into special agreements outside the Convention. 16 
The only restriction on these agreements is that they not contravene the 
provisions of the Convention. Examples of such special agreements are the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty and the European Patent Convention. 
The final key element of the convention is the dispute resolution section. 17 
The preferred settlement mechanism is negotiation, but members have recourse 
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) if negotiation fails. This procedure 
requires the consent of both parties before an action can be brought before the 
ICJ and there is no effective enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with 
ICJ rulings. 18 
Criticisms of the Paris Convention 
Despite the longevity of the Convention, it has come under increasing attack 
from both developed and developing countries. The critique of developing 
14 See Article 5(A)(l). 
15 See Article 5(A)(2). 
16 See Article 19. 
17 See Article 28(1). 
18 The only real weapon at the disposal of an aggrieved country is to deny the other 
country patent protection. This crude weapon may not be effective if the aggrieved 
country is dependant on the other country as a market. For example, it can be argued that 
the United States Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 is in violation of the 
Convention as it only grants protection in the United States to nationals of foreign 
countries that provide comparable protection to American nationals. This would violate 
Article 2 of the Convention governing national treatment. Still, 18 countries have 
enacted reciprocal legislation in order to meet the American demand. None has taken 
action under the Paris Convention against the United States. See R. M. Gadbaw, 
"Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or Marriage of Convenience?" 
(1989) 22 Vand. J. ofTransnat'l L. 223 at 234-239. 
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nations has centred on the general intent of the Convention and a perceived lack 
of specific measures to deal with the problems of industrial development faced 
by technology-poor countries. The critique from the developed world has 
stemmed from the perceived ineffectiveness of the Paris Convention in securing 
the protection of intellectual property rights, including patent protection. 
Attack from the Developing World 
Although two thirds of the Convention members are developing countries, 
they have had little influence in determining the terms of the treaty. Many 
developing countries were not in a position to influence the last of the 
Convention revisions in 1967 as they had only recently gained their 
independence from colonial powers. 
The holistic criticism made by many developing nations is that the 
Convention is directed toward reward of the inventor and not to the technology 
transfer and development needs of developing nations. The Committee on 
Transfer of Technology of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development describes Article I of the Convention as follows: 
It is in fact a charter of rights for patent holders, its essential 
concern being to determine and safeguard their privileges. As 
contrasted with the detail and precision with which their 
privileges are stated, there is little about the rights of the States 
which grant these privileges. There is little recognition of the 
public interest that is expected to be served by the system of 
patents and few provisions about the remedial measures to 
deal with possible abuses of the system. 19 
The Committee recommended a revision in the philosophy of the Convention 
that would enable developing countries to place technological and industrial 
needs ahead of inventor rights. 20 
In order to effect this philosophical shift, the Committee recommends 
changes to specific provisions of the Convention. Not surprisingly, the major 
shift is in the principle of national treatment. The Committee argues that this 
principle "merely protects the rights of foreign patent holders so far as the 
developing countries are concerned, and can be characterized as a reverse 
system of preferences in the markets of developing countries for foreign patent 
19 Committee on Transfer of Technology, The International Patent System: The Revision 
of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, UN CT AD, 1977, 
UNDOC TD/B/c.6/ AC. 312 at 4. 
20 Ibid. at 7. 
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holders."21 Given the technological advantage of developed countries over 
developing countries, it is argued that national treatment ensures that local 
inventors in developing countries would be overwhelmed by foreign inventors 
while having virtually no chance at having a product patented in a developed 
country.22 In order to avoid the national treatment requirement, some developing 
nations such as India have refused to participate in the Paris Convention. 
The Committee argues that developing countries should be free to designate 
certain sectors with a local novelty requirement that would grant patents only 
where the invention was adapted to local conditions. 23 This type of patent would 
only be available to nationals of the developing country to encourage the 
application of foreign technology to their particular needs. Such a provision in 
national patent legislation would leave the country in violation of the national 
treatment rule of the currently constituted Paris Convention. 
A second suggested change to specific convention provisions concerns 
Article 5(A)(4) of the Convention governing compulsory licensing. The 
Committee states "the compulsory licensing procedure [of the Paris Convention] 
has proved in practice of virtually no value whatsoever."24 Developing nations 
argue that the article gives inventors an abusive monopoly for three years after 
the grant of the patent. Examples of abusive practices include the failure to 
work an invention in the developing country with the expressed intention of 
preventing it from competing with an existing product or the sale of a quantity of 
the invention well below demand to drive up the price. The failure to work is of 
particular concern to developing countries given that estimates of the percentage 
of patents not worked run as high as 95 percent. 25 
The third major change suggested to the Convention concerns article 
5(A)(l) which prevents forfeiture of the patent on the grounds that the patented 
item is being imported into the country. The Committee argues that developing 
countries should be free to demand local production of the patented item, at least 
21 Ibid. at 25. 
22 This would appear to be borne out by findings of the United Nations (see The role of 
the patent system, supra note 5). It was found that nationals of developing countries own 
16 percent of patents in their own country and 1 percent of the world stock of patents. 
Both the relative deficiency in technological infrastructure and the lack of capital 
available to test inventions in developing countries are seen as contributing to the 
inability of the developing country inventor to compete with the developed country 
inventor. See ibid. at 41-42. 
23 Committee on Transfer of Technology, supra note 19 at 25. 
24 Ibid. at I 0. 
25 Differences in figures stem from the difficulty in obtaining accurate figures of what 
inventions are and are not worked in a specific country. The 95 percent figure is arrived 
at by Shlomo Cohen using United Nations data in "Compulsory Licensing of Patents -
The Paris Convention Model," (1979) 20 Idea 153 at 186. 
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in those sectors where the national economy can support such production.26 
After being presented with the findings of the Transfer of Technology 
Committee, developing nations began a concerted push to alter the Paris 
Convention in the March 1980 Geneva meetings of the Convention members. 
They called for a reexamination of the convention in light of the role of the 
patent system in the transfer of technology to developing countries.27 To date, 
their efforts have been unsuccessful. 
Attack from the Developed World 
While developing nations have expressed concern about excessive 
restrictions in the Paris Convention as currently constituted, developed nations 
have complained about its lack of effectiveness. Two approaches have been 
utilized by developed countries to achieve their goals. The first was the 
multilateral approach adopted through the acceptance of a model law for 
invention in 1970. The second has been the unilateral approach of the United 
States since the early 1970s, which is largely a response to the perceived 
ineffectiveness of the multilateral approach. Both approaches attempt to secure 
a minimum level of patent protection for all countries. 
The multilateral approach began in 1963 with discussions at the United 
International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPl)28 for 
the development of a model law for inventions in developing countries. The 
model law contained four principles supporting the acceptance of a minimum 
patent protection period: the first was that inventor disclosure is preferable to the 
maintenance of trade secrets; the second was that a patent system encourages 
research and invention; the third was that it would attract investor capital; and 
the fourth was that it would provide a self-regulating means of rewarding 
inventors. 29 
The model law argues for the adoption of a 16-20 year patent protection 
period, stating that "[t]here would be no particular advantage in developing 
countries in having a shorter period. It would adversely affect local patentees, or 
26 Committee on Transfer of Technology, supra note 19 at 16. 
27 H. P. Kunz-Hallstein, "The United States Proposal for a GATT Agreement on 
Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property," 
(1989) 22 Vand. J. Transnat'I L. 265 at 265. 
28 BIRPI was the predecessor to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 
29 UNCTAD, Restrictive business practices: An analysis of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization model laws for the developing countries from the point of view of 
the export interests of the developing countries, UNCTAD, 1972, UN DOC. TD/B/398 at 
5 [hereinafter Restrictive Business Practices]. 
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local licensees of patent rights originating abroad."30 The obvious bias of this 
model law toward developed countries has been highlighted by later United 
Nations studies critical of it. A 1972 U.N. study noted that "the model on 
inventions is based on the patent system as generally accepted in very many 
developed countries of the world for the protection and exploitation of new 
inventions." 31 Perhaps not surprisingly, many developing countries refused to 
adopt the legislation or did so with considerable exceptions as to products that 
were covered by patents.32 
Partly as a result of the ineffectiveness of the voluntary model law on 
inventions and partly in response to protectionist domestic trade pressures, in 
1974 the United States embarked on a unilateral program of protection of 
American intellectual property rights abroad. The American ideal can be seen in 
the comments of American patent lawyer Charles A. Hunnicutt at a forum 
discussing the intellectual property implications of the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. Hunnicutt 
states: 
A reality I think we tend to lose sight of in our current 
movement to protect intellectual property is that intellectual 
property costs money; it costs government resources and it 
costs private sector resources in terms of the costs of multiple 
searches and registrations as well as enforcement. These costs 
would be significantly reduced if registration for intellectual 
property were available through one application, in the 
applicant's language, for the issuance of one patent, or 
trademark, or one copyright world-wide. 33 
Implicit in Hunnicutt's paradigm is that the one level of universal patent 
protection is closer to the American standard of protection than that of India. 
Unlike the developing countries, which lack the economic and political 
clout to unilaterally effect significant changes in the patent system, the United 
States has been able to take national measures that have enforced certain 
minimum levels of compliance from other countries. This has been 
accomplished through successive strengthening of the United States Trade Act 
as a tool for enforcing American trade goals. 
30 Ibid. at 9. 
31 Ibid. at 5. 
32 The United Nations Report on the role of patent system in technology transfer provides 
a list of areas commonly excluded from patent protection including food and 
pharmaceutical products as well as the countries that exclude them from protection. See 
supra note 5, at 53. 
33 C.A. Hunnicutt, "The Trade Act of 1988 and the MTNs: Long-Term Planning and 
Reform," (1989) 19 Ga. J. Int'! and Comp. L. 296 at 302. 
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Intellectual property first became a target of American trade legislation with 
the adoption of the 1974 Trade Act34 that authorized the executive branch to 
negotiate a reduction in barriers to trade in services while providing American 
exporters of services with recourse against unfair trade practices. Congressional 
dissatisfaction with presidential utilization of this weapon led to the passage of 
the 1984 Trade Act35 which required the President to take into account the 
protection a foreign nation affords to intellectual property rights when 
determining that country's eligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences 
and whether actions of the country should be considered unreasonable for 
purposes of section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act.36 
The unilateral approach has met with considerable success among countries 
that rely heavily on the United States for trade. South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Singapore all made substantive revisions to their patent systems in response to 
threatened use of the section 301 provisions of the 1974 Trade Act. 31 Similar 
changes have recently been enacted in Mexico. 38 
The United States has shown a willingness to impose intellectual property 
standards on developed as well as developing countries. The 1984 
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act39 is an example of the former practice. It 
limits American patent protection in the area of semiconductor designs to the 
nationals of countries that provide similar protection to American nationals. 
Although this provision could be challenged as a violation of the Paris 
Convention guarantee of national treatment in Article 2(1), eighteen countries 
have applied for and received reciprocal protection from the United States.40 
While it is not clear that semiconductor chip designs are a patent issue, the fact 
that the United States is willing to apply trade leverage against developed as 
well as developing countries in securing intellectual property protection is 
significant. It demonstrates the degree to which the United States is prepared to 
34 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618. 
35 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573. 
36 The Generalized System of Preferences is a classification tool by which the American 
government determines the duties to be applied against the products of other countries. 
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act allows the executive to take action against "unfair" 
trade practices of other countries by applying duties against their products. A good 
overview of the evolution of American trade legislation can be found in Gadbaw, supra 
note 18 at 229. 
37 Each of these countries passed comprehensive legislation governing patents, copyrights 
and trademarks. See Gadbaw, supra note 18 at 229. 
38 See the Ley de Fomento y Proteccion de la Propriedad industrial enacted June 26, 
1991 as reported in G. A. Pemberton and M. Soni, Jr., "Mexico's 1991 Industrial 
Property Law," (1992) 25 Cornell Int'! L. J. 103. 
39 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620. 
40 See Gadbaw, supra note 18 at 236. 
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violate existing international norms in pursuing domestic economic goals. As 
will be shown later, the political capacity of the American government to act as 
a "rogue elephant" in pursuing its goals may have much more weight in 
determining whether or not an international patent system is established than any 
philosophical or economic factors. 
American power to apply punitive sanctions against countries with 
"inadequate" patent systems was further strengthened in 1988 with the adoption 
of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.41 The Act has two key 
components with respect to intellectual property rights. The first is that it has 
"inscribed the protection of intellectual property rights as one of the principle 
priorities of United States trade policy."42 The second is the strengthening of 
section 301 by giving the United States Trade Representative the power to: 
a) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of 
trade agreement concessions ... 
b) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods and 
fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country ... or 
c) enter into binding agreements with such foreign country ... 
[to] eliminate the unfair act, policy or practice.43 
Thus, if the Trade Commissioner believes a country is failing to provide 
adequate intellectual property protection to American companies or exporters, 
she or he can take actions against such countries.44 The shift in power to the 
Trade Commissioner is significant in that the President loses full discretion over 
decisions relating to the imposition of trade sanctions. 
Conclusion 
The Paris Convention's perceived failings are effectively summarized by 
Ulrich Joos and Rainer Moufang in an address to the Max-Planck Society 
Conference on Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition 
Law. They state that: 
Demands - triggered by the UNCT AD study dealing with the 
role of the patent system in the transfer of technology - to 
adapt the Convention to the specific needs of developing 
countries were rejected, in particular by the U.S. standing in 
the forefront of the countries that defended the status 
41 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418. 
42 See Gadbaw, supra note 18 at 223. 
43 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, ?301, as am. Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). [Taken from 
Gadbaw, ibid. at 224.] 
44 Hunnicutt provides an excellent overview of the 1988 Act. See supra note 33 at 301. 
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quo .... This experience apparently led the U.S. to the 
conclusion that an improvement of the [Paris Convention] 
could not be achieved in the present context of the North-
South conflict. On the other hand, the U.S. share the opinion 
that the existing intellectual property Conventions do not 
guarantee any longer a sufficient protection corresponding to 
the needs of inventors and authors and of the respective 
national economies. Lack of enforcement provisions and of 
dispute settlement procedures is criticized.45 
13 
Thus, the Paris Convention is seen by a growing number of participants as either 
too restrictive or not restrictive enough. Furthermore, the rift is increasingly 
emerging outside the diplomatic realm through the American use of unilateral 
trade sanctions to secure patent compliance from other countries. 
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants46 attempts to provide plant breeders protection for the development of 
new plant varieties,47 filling a gap left in the scope of the Paris Convention.48 
Applicants must apply to each of the member states separately for protection, 
and they gain a minimum of 15 years protection for their plant variety if 
successful.49 In addition to the Paris Convention principles of national treatment 
and right of priority, the Plant Variety Convention requires member states to 
protect a minimum number of plant varieties under their national law before they 
may join the convention.50 
Participation in the Convention has been limited to 19 developed nations,51 
however its significance extends beyond its immediate subject material. As it is 
not administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization, it 
demonstrates a willingness of industrialized countries to act outside existing 
multilateral cooperative mechanisms to promote minimum levels and scope of 
patent protection. Agreements such as the Plant Variety Convention may form 
the basis for a new international developed country patent system under the 
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
45 F.K. Beier and G. Schricker, eds. GAIT or WIPO? New Ways in the International 
Protection of Intellectual Property (Munich: IIC Studies, 1989) at 21. 
46 The Convention is set out in Leaffer, supra note 9 at 55-75 [hereinafter Plant Variety 
Convention]. 
47 Articles l and 2. 
48 Leaffer, supra note 9 at 53. 
49 Article 8. 
50 Article 4. 
51 Leaffer, supra note 9 at 54. 
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Patent Cooperation Treaty 
The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) is the mosf e.xtensive agreement 
concluded under the auspices of the Paris Convention. 52 The PCT greatly eases 
the administration of multiple-nation patent applications by allowing the patent 
seeker to make one application to the central organization (WIPO) which will 
conduct a full search of the international state of the art.53 The applicant can 
select the countries to which they wish to apply for protection and the results of 
the international search are then sent to each of the relevant member nations.54 
The international bureau then publishes the patent applications.55 
In addition to the state of the art review, the international bureau will also 
do a preliminary examination to determine whether the invention appears to be 
new, non-obvious, and industrially applicable if the applicant so requests. The 
results of this review are not binding on member states. 
While the organization provides a central registry and common applications 
process, it does not circumvent domestic patent processes. Applicants are still 
required to meet the relevant criteria for patent protection in each country 
applied to, and to pay the relevant registration fees of those countries. As of the 
beginning of 1990, 43 countries were party to the PCT with roughly half of the 
members being developing countries.56 
Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification 
The Strasbourg Agreement Concerning International Patent Classification 
was concluded in 1971 under the auspices of the Paris Convention. It is an 
information-sharing and categorization agreement which divides the technology 
that may be the subject of patents into 8 sections and 46,000 subdivisions.57 
Each classification is given a symbol that can be used in universal searches to 
determine the prior art. While the agreement encourages the unification of 
patent legislation, it only requires that member states utilize the classification 
system as a primary or subsidiary means of classifying patent applications.58 
52 The treaty was concluded in Washington in June of 1970 and entered into force in 
1978. 
53 Articles 15-17 of the Treaty govern search procedures. 
54 Article 20 of the Treaty. 
55 Article 21. 
56 See Leaffer, supra note 9 at 77-78. 
57 See generally Leaffer, supra note 9 at 531. 
58 See Article 4(2). 
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Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of 
Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure 
This 1977 treaty came into force in 1980 and endeavoured to ensure 
common procedures for the disclosure of microorganism patents. 59 It sets up a 
number of international depository authorities (IDA) which keep the deposited 
sample organisms in storage. Deposit in a single IDA is deemed to meet the 
requirements of deposit in all member states.60 As with the Plant Variety 
Convention, membership in the Treaty has been limited to developed countries. 
Treaty Patent System 
The most sweeping proposals for change within the Paris Union came with 
a WIPO conference in May 1984 that was initially designed only to deal with 
questions of grace period harmonization. Ultimately, this meeting led to an 
examination of broader areas of cooperation.61 Representatives of 48 nations 
have participated in this "Treaty Patent System" (TPS) round of negotiations and 
preliminary positions have been established in five key areas: a common grace 
period after public disclosure, application of the first-to-file principle, 
transferability of patent applications, patent rights, and patent remedies.62 
The common grace period is an effort to address the problem of public 
disclosure of an invention leading to its loss of novelty for the purposes of 
making a patent application. Only a limited range of countries currently allow 
inventors grace periods in the case of non-prejudicial disclosure of inventions. 63 
Grace periods have been supported on three grounds: that many inventors are 
unaware that disclosure will jeopardize patentability, that inventors often are 
unaware that an invention is patentable until someone to whom they show it 
draws this to their attention, and that inventors are often required to disclose 
59 The Treaty is set out in Leaffer, supra note 9 at 127-140. 
60 Article 3(l)(a). 
61 K. M. Curesky, "International Patent Harmonization Through W.I.P.0.: An Analysis of 
the U.S. Proposal to Adopt a "First-to-File" Patent System," (1989), 21 Law & Pol'y in 
Int'! Bus. 289 at 292. 
62 This material has been drawn from Curesky, ibid., and W.T. Fryer, "Patent Law 
Harmonization Treaty Decision is Not Far Off- What Course Should the U.S. Take?: A 
Review of the Current Situation and Alternatives Available," (1990), 30 Idea 309. The 
commentary is on the 7th meeting of the group of experts on patent law harmonization 
which shaped the August, 1991 draft Treaty. 
63 An example of a non-prejudicial disclosure would be if an invention was stolen and its 
details published. Currently, only the EEC, Japan, Canada, the United States, Belgium, 
Australia, Japan, USSR and Brazil apply grace periods. See Curesky, supra note 61 at 
298. 
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their inventions in order to receive financial backing. The TPS would establish a 
one-year common grace period for the non-prejudicial disclosure of inventions. 
The second, and perhaps most surprising recommendation, is the universal 
adoption of a first-to-file system. In March 1987, the United States delegation to 
the TPS indicated that the American government was willing to consider the 
adoption of a first-to-file system if it were part of a balanced treaty package. 64 
This system is philosophically grounded in the notion that the first true inventor 
should have sole claim to the invention. It allows the first true inventor (in fact) 
to file for and successfully claim patent rights years after another (but later) true 
inventor has filed for and received a patent. Consequently, it leaves patent 
holders uncertain about their rights as other inventors might come forward at a 
later date claiming they were the first true inventor. All other nations in the 
world rely on a first-to-file system that awards the patent to the first true 
inventor to file the application. 
The next major item is the requirement that members accept applications 
following the guidelines set out in the treaty. The acceptance of a common 
patent application form, in combination with the provisions already in place 
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, would allow inventors to submit one form 
to a central office. The information contained on that form would be sufficient 
to meet the patent information requirements of each country, eliminating the 
inventor's need to tailor applications to each country. 
The fourth area concerns the definition of the scope of patent rights. This 
includes, for example, the level of scientific research utilizing patented 
inventions that should be allowed prior to the expiry of the patent. While 
agreement has not been reached on all factors determining what is to be 
protected, a consensus appears to be developing on the doctrine of equivalents.65 
The United States currently utilizes a doctrine of equivalents to prevent the 
copying of the essence of an invention. This contrasts with countries such as 
Japan which allow the copying of the essence of an invention as long as there 
are minor modifications.66 The adoption of the doctrine of equivalents would 
broaden the scope of existing patents, providing additional protection for 
inventors. 
On the most critical of patent rights, the duration of protection, consensus 
also appears to have developed among the key industrialized countries.67 The 
64 Ibid. at 294. Since November 19, 1987 when Royal Assent was given to Bill C-22 in 
Canada which changed the Canadian approach to a first-to-file system, the United States 
and the Philippines have been the only two countries retaining a first-to-invent system. 
65 Ibid. at 300. 
66 Ibid. at 300. 
67 Ibid. at 302. 
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United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland all recommended the adoption of a twenty-year minimum 
patent protection period at the Fourth Session of the TPS negotiations. 
However, Brazil and Argentina, which lead the developing nations at the TPS 
negotiations, argued that the goal of the TPS should be harmonization and not 
uniformization. They contended that nations should be left to set their own 
periods of protection in order to tailor their systems to local development needs. 
The final area of discussion in the draft Treaty is the scope of exclusions 
from patent protection. The United States, Switzerland, and Japan insisted that 
any balanced package would have to place limitations on the products and 
processes that could be excluded from patent protection.68 Of particular interest 
to the United States were guarantees that genetically engineered plant and 
animal life, along with the processes for producing them, would be protected 
against exclusion in national patent systems. The question of exclusions has 
been the most controversial area in the TPS discussions. Developing countries 
have argued vociferously for their right to exclude products where it is necessary 
to support local economic or development interests and propose that there be no 
restrictions on exclusions in the treaty.69 
The final area dealt with in the draft Treaty is the provision of remedies for 
the violation of patent protection. While there is general agreement that 
remedies should be provided, member states have been unable to agree on 
compensation and damage standards. 
The draft Treaty provides evidence that many nations are willing to discuss 
patent harmonization, but agreement is likely to be limited to procedural issues 
such as the transferability of patent application forms between countries. 
William Duffey has observed that in the opinion of many in the legal 
community, "even if an international harmonization treaty were to emerge from 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) within the next year or 
two, few countries would ratify the treaty."70 
Regional Treaties 
The most comprehensive examples of regional cooperation are the African 
and Malagasy Industrial Property Office (OAMPl)71 and the Scandinavian Patent 
68 Ibid. at 304. 
69 Ibid. at 305. 
70 W.H. Duffey, "Patent Harmonization Can Enhance the Global Competitiveness of 
Canada and the United States," (1988), 14 Can.-U.S. L. J. 271. 
71 Member states are the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Benin, Gabon, the Ivory 
Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, the United Republic of Cameroon, 
and Burkina Faso. 
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Community (SPC). 72 In both systems, identical patent laws are in place in each 
country with full transferability of patents among the member states. OAMPI 
was launched in 1962 with the adoption of the Libreville Accord and has been a 
financial, as well as a cooperative, success. Since 1964, fees generated from 
applications have covered the operating costs of the organization.73 The 
Scandinavian Patent Community was established in 1964 and maintains national 
patent offices for the application of a Nordic Patent Law.74 
Quickly approaching OAMPI and the SPC in comprehensiveness is the 
European Economic Community (EEC). The current basis of EEC patent 
cooperation is the European Patent Convention which was adopted in 1973 and 
came into force in 1977.75 The Convention establishes common rules for the 
issuance of patents among member states but leaves enforcement to the national 
levels of government. The Common Market Patent Convention, which is due to 
enter into force on January 1, 1993, would take this cooperation even further by 
establishing common enforcement mechanisms.76 
TheGATT 
Since 1947, members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) have worked to reduce barriers to trade among its members. The 
current negotiations of the GATT began in 1982 with a Ministerial Meeting in 
Geneva that concluded there should be an examination of barriers to trade in the 
service sector. The scope of the negotiations has gradually expanded, but four 
contentious areas remain: agriculture, textile safeguards, services, and the 
protection of intellectual property.77 
Under the current terms of the GA TT, Article XX( d) places adoption of 
enforcement of necessary measures to secure "the protection of patents, trade 
marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices" among the 
general exceptions of the GATT.78 Consequently, trade sanctions are not 
permitted in attempting to secure compliance with intellectual property 
standards. Thus, when Brazil challenged the decision of the United States to 
72 Participating members are Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
73 United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at I 6-17. 
74 W.S. Wolfeld, "International Patent Cooperation: The Next Step," (1983) 16 Cornell 
Int'! L. J. 229 at 238-239. 
75 Leaffer, supra note 9 at 141-42. 
76 Ibid. at 142. 
77 M. Kakabadse, "Current Status of the Uruguay Round," (1989) 19 Ga. J. Int'! & Comp. 
L. 292. 
78 C.A.P. Braga, "The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GA TT: A View 
From the South," (1989) 22 Vand. J. Transnat'I L. 243 at 247. 
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remove trade concessions on the basis of Brazil's failure to meet U.S. 
intellectual property standards, Brazil was able to bring action against the 
American government under the GATT.79 
Largely at the insistence of the United States, change was sought to Article 
XX(d) which led to the adoption of what Braga has termed "a masterpiece of 
diplomatic compromise."80 The negotiating basis for the Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) states: 
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to 
international trade, and taking into account the need to 
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights and to ensure that measures and procedures to 
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become 
barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify 
GA TT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and 
disciplines.81 
Although there would likely have been an American push to include patent 
protection in the GATT in any event, the perceived futility of the Paris 
Convention negotiations resulted in increased efforts to obtain reform through 
the GATT process. As Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein notes: 
It may be that this experience has led the United States to 
believe that in the present political context of North-South 
conflict, there is no possibility of agreement among the great 
number of member states of the Paris Union on proposals to 
further improve the system of the Paris Convention. This may 
also be one of the reasons why the United States has proposed 
to include intellectual property matters in the negotiations of 
the so-called "Uruguay Round" of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).82 
The United States has not been alone in its attempts to secure patent 
protection under the GATT. In June 1988, a joint statement was issued by key 
segments of the European, Japanese, and American business communities.83 It 
called for priority to be given to intellectual property protection in the Uruguay 
79 Gadbaw, supra note 18 at 231. 
80 Braga, supra note 78 at 248. 
81 Ministerial· Declaration of Punta Del Este, of September 20, I986, as quoted in Ibid. at 
248. 
82 Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 27 at 266-67. 
83 The business communities are: in' Europe, the Union of Industrial and Employers' 
Confederation of Europe; in Japan, the Keidanren; and in the United States, the 
Intellectual Property Committee. See R.E. Berenbeim, Safeguarding Intellectual 
Property (New York: The Conference Board, 1989) at 2. 
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Round with the approval of a three-part code. The first was the assurance of 
effective, equitable, and non-discriminatory enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. The second was the establishment of dispute settlement procedures to 
ensure domestic laws of GATT members include basic intellectual property 
protection and enforcement mechanisms. The third was the granting of 
preferential trade treatment for signatories to encourage adherence to intellectual 
property standards. 84 
Although the GATT approach represents a potential political abandonment 
of the Paris Convention, it would not represent a legal violation of the 
Convention as provision is made for the establishment of special agreements 
under article 19. Kunz-Hallstein states, "we may therefore conclude that 
member states of the Paris convention would not be hindered under this treaty in 
seeking improvements of the international system of industrial property 
protection within the framework of other international arrangements such as 
GATT." 85 Thus, as long as the terms of the Paris Convention were met, such as 
national treatment, there would be nothing stopping GATT members from 
refusing to grant preferential trade status to countries refusing to meet specified 
standards for the protection of intellectual property. 
Conclusion 
The Paris Convention was one of the first and most comprehensive 
multilateral attempts at regulating state behaviour in international law. It has 
also been one of the most successful in terms of meeting its goals. However, the 
Paris Convention and related agreements are increasingly seen as inadequate by 
both proponents and opponents of an international patent system. 
Efforts by the developing world to alter the terms of the Paris Convention 
under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on Trade and 
Development provide evidence of the developing world's dissatisfaction with 
existing arrangements. Efforts by the United States and other developed 
countries to cooperate outside the World Intellectual Property Organization 
structure through agreements such as the Plant Variety Convention and, more 
recently, through the GATT, demonstrate the danger of a collapse in the existing 
system. Were the GA TT to permit trade discrimination on the basis of 
"inadequate" patent protection, developing nations that are increasingly 
orienting their economies to international markets would have little choice but to 
comply with demands that a rigorous protection of patent rights be accepted. 
Before accepting such a fate, it would be imperative that the philosophical and 
84 Ibid. 
85 Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 27 at 271. 
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economic arguments, which ground current assumptions about the benefits of an 
international patent system, be analyzed. 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The first known patent statute containing what would now be regarded as having 
the basic elements of patent protection was enacted by the City State of Venice 
in 1472. 86 The Venetian statute outlined four key goals for the grant of patents. 87 
They were general utility to society, encouragement of inventive activity, refund 
of costs incurred by the inventor, and the inventor's rights to the fruits of his or 
her mind. The Venetian goals have elements of both major philosophical 
approaches to the granting of patents. These approaches may be classified as the 
rights approach and the utilitarian approach to patent protection. 
Rights Approach to Patent Protection 
The rights approach to patent protection is rooted in the last of the Venetian 
goals, that the inventor has the right to the fruits of her or his mind. The purest 
form of this approach can be found in the preamble of the 1791 French patent 
law: "Every novel idea whose realization or development can become useful to 
society belongs primarily to him who conceived it, and it would be a violation of 
the rights of man in their very essence if an industrial invention were not 
regarded as the property of its creator."88 
The rights approach is grounded in a perceived imperative that the 
individual owns that which they improve or create. Perhaps the best known 
proponent of this approach is John Locke. Section V of Locke's Second 
Treatise ofGovernment, 89 entitled "Of Property," outlines the basis of ownership 
rights: "As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use 
the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, 
inclose it from the common."90 Although Locke did not consider the specific 
issue of patents, the argument for patents can be made by analogy to his theory. 
If inventions are seen as a mixing of physical resources with intellectual 
capabilities (Locke's cultivation of land) and inventions are limited to areas not 
86 United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 32. Though this was the 
first actual patent legislation, Ladas describes a system of trade marks in Ancient Greece 
and Rome that could be seen as the rudimentary beginnings of an industrial property 
system. (S.P. Ladas, The International Protection of Industrial Property (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1930) at 6-7. 
87 United Nations, ibid. at 44. 
88 Ibid. 
89 J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980). 
90 Ibid. at 21. 
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already deemed "state of the art" (the unenclosed land) then an individual is 
entitled to protection for novel inventions. 
While Locke's rights can be used to outline the effects of a right to patent 
protection, the goal of this paper is to analyze the benefits of an international 
patent system. Consequently, the various underlying justifications for the rights 
approach must be examined in order to assess their validity. While there are a 
number of ways to present the differing justifications for rights based systems, a 
helpful division can be found through the use of a spectrum from natural law to 
positivist conceptions of rights. Pure natural law justifications (such as Locke's) 
ground their rights conceptions in reason while pure positivist rights schemes 
base their rights on political legitimacy. Between these extremes are the 
reciprocal rights schemes which utilize a combination of rationality and political 
justifications. The underlying justifications of each of these four broad 
categories will be examined to determine their legitimacy. 
Rational external basis for right 
< 
Pure Natural Law 
(e.g. Locke) 
Full Reciprocal Rights 
(e.g. Gewirth) 
Pure Natural Law Rights 
Political external basis for right 
> 




Natural law conceptions of rights justify the existence of rights through 
rationality. Margaret MacDonald notes that "[p]ropositions about natural law 
and natural rights are not generalizations from experience nor deductions from 
observed facts subsequently confirmed by experience. Yet they are not totally 
disconnected from natural fact. For they are known as entailed by the intrinsic 
or essential nature of man. Thus they are known by reason."91 
There are two major strands of natural law justifications for patents. The 
first, which I term the moral imperative strand, rationally deduces that 
individuals have a moral right to the product of their labours. As this right is not 
grounded in economic qualifications, it would result in a patent system with 
rights of unlimited duration (or at least for the lifetime of the inventor). This 
moral right is seen as a trump to considerations such as the economic welfare of 
others. Given the potentially dire and continuing consequences, both in terms of 
crowding out future inventions and in monopolistic price gouging, this strand of 
natural law has not been adopted in any country with respect to patents. No 
patent system grants an unlimited duration of protection. 
91 M. MacDonald "Natural Rights," in J. Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1984) at 25. 
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The second strand of natural law patent justification, which I term the 
economic imperative strand, argues that the awarding of patent protection to 
individuals is rationally the most efficient means of securing economic 
development. The classic proponent of this theory is John Locke whose 
rationality is grounded in Christian conceptions of God granting the world to 
Adam (the embodiment of humanity in common) "to make use of it to the best 
advantage of life, and convenience."92 Locke argues that the grant of land was 
for industrial and rational use and that this use can best be secured through his 
system of private property rights.93 Thus, patent rights would be seen as a 
rational right to the fruits of one's hands based on the fulfillment of God's desire 
that the productivity of land be maximized through the encouragement of 
industrious behaviour from individuals. 
It is interesting to note that Locke places an important qualification on his 
property rights doctrine. He argues that "nor was this appropriation of any 
parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was 
still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use."94 
Given the educational and technological advantages of industrialized states over 
developing countries, it is difficult to argue that there is "enough, and as good 
left," for them to invent. Thus the equity which Locke would claim in the 
system would be lost. 
While Locke's conception of rights is only one natural law approach, it 
serves to highlight the two difficulties inherent in any justification relying on 
natural law. The first is that the assumptions underlying the right are not 
necessarily shared by individuals from differing socio-political backgrounds. 
The second is that "rational" individuals can arrive at different results using the 
same assumptions. 
While many Christians may accept the assumption that the Earth was given 
to men and women to use as they see fit, other cultures place a premium on 
harmony with nature, not domination over it.95 If maximizing productivity is not 
the aim of society, the rational deduction that a patent system is necessary to 
secure this production would be challenged.96 
92 Locke, supra note 89 at 18. 
93 Ibid. at 18-30. 
94 Ibid. at 21. 
95 While traditionally tribal-based societies, including many of Canada's First Nations, 
may be a visible example of this, the growing acceptance of sustainable development as 
outlined by the Bruntland Commission provides evidence that Western industrialized 
societies may be tempering their view of environmental domination. 
96 For example, it may be more efficient to hunt with a gun than a boomerang, but the 
invention of such a device in a tribal grouping need not be viewed as an "advance". 
Ritualistic aspects of the traditional hunt may be critical to the social well-being of the 
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Even if it is assumed that there is general acceptance of the maximization of 
production principle, "rationality" need not dictate that patent rights be granted. 
The rationality MacDonald highlights as common to all natural law conceptions 
of rights is not a neutral mathematical standard that all would agree is correct. 
For example, Marxist theory views differential rewards based on a measure of 
talents as an inefficient way of maximizing wealth. 97 Consequently, natural law 
conceptions of rights based on Marxism would rationally deduce that wealth 
would be distributed according to needs and not talents. This was largely the 
case in the People's Republic of China prior to the adoption of the new Patent 
Law in 1984.98 As patents systems are rooted in financially rewarding the 
individuals who make the invention, they would be unacceptable given the 
assumptions of natural law utilizing Marxist principles.99 
It may be argued that given the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and moves in 
remaining Marxist countries such as China to accept incentive rewards, 100 the 
rational argument for rights is becoming unified through an acceptance of the 
right to the product of one's labour as the most efficient means to production. 
The key to this argument is that rights-based private property systems (with 
patents as a component of them) are more economically efficient than other 
models. If it were shown that patents were not the most efficient system or that 
the effects of such a system were economically ambiguous, this "rational" 
argument would fall. Thus, current natural law justifications for patents (derived 
from the second strand of natural law thinking) are rooted in reasoning about 
economic efficiency. The statistical validity of this reasoning will be examined 
in the economics section of the paper. 
tribal group. Thus, inventions may be viewed as a backward step in social development. 
97 See generally K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin, 
1967) at 96-100 arguing for an egalitarian distribution of property and K. Marx, "Critique 
of the Gotha Programme" in Marx and Engels: Basic Writings (London: Fontana, 1984), 
particularly at 153-161 from which the quotation "From each according to his ability, to 
each according to his needs!" was drawn. 
98 Beaumont, supra note 3 at 45. 
99 As with any interpretation of Marx, care must be taken in drawing conclusions. In the 
Communist Manifesto, Marx states that "Do you mean [to abolish] the property of the 
petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois 
farm? There is no need to abolish that." (see supra footnote 97 at 96) Thus, Marxist 
theory could allow a restricted use of rewards for inventions by "small" inventors. Still, 
Marx's overriding concern is that individuals receive societal output according to needs, 
thus any use of these patent-style rewards would be severely restricted. 
100 See particularly articles 60 and 61 of the Chinese Patent Law (1984) which grants 
foreign patent holders an exclusive right of exploitation and provides protection against 
infringement. Reproduced in Kay, supra note 3 at 368-378. 
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Full Reciprocal Rights 
The next rights-based justification of patents can be found in full reciprocal 
rights systems such as that of Gewirth. 101 Again, there are two elements of right-
obtaining process: the assumption and the processing of the assumption. 
Gewirth assumes that rights are to be granted where individuals would not want 
others to be able to interfere with their scope of action in a particular area. In 
general terms, the. assumption is processed by individual A demanding a right. 
Individuals B, C, and D would have to ask: "Would I want others to be able to 
control my actions in that area?" If the answer is no, a right is found. 
In terms of patents, an individual might ask for the right to the products of 
her or his labour, in this case, patent protection. If the others decided that they 
would not want any individual to prevent them from getting the fruits of their 
labour (protection for their inventions), then a right to patent protection would 
be found. 
The key criticism of this approach is that patent rights are not likely to be 
granted in situations where society is not made up of individuals with equal 
economic potential. If an individual knew that they did not have inventive 
capabilities, they would be likely to reject the inventor's claims, arguing that 
everyone should have immediate access to inventions. 
Gewirth's argument can be transferred on a national level to current 
disagreements between developing and developed countries over patent systems. 
Developing countries lack the educational and technological infrastructure 
necessary to compete with developed countries in many areas of invention. 
Consequently they would be likely to argue that others should be able gain the 
fruits of their citizens' inventive labour in the full knowledge that this loss 
would be more than compensated for by the gain in free access to the fruits of 
the inventors of the developed world. 
Tempered Reciprocal Rights 
John Rawls utilizes a veil of ignorance to attempt to avoid the problem that 
knowing one's own economic status poses for Gewirth's system. 102 Rawls 
argues that the test for economic distribution should be done behind a veil of 
ignorance where individuals are unaware of their earning potential (or inventive 
potential in the case of patents). He predicts that behind this veil, individuals 
would rationally calculate that they might be the least well-off individual after 
101 See A. Gewirth, "The Basis and Content of Human Rights," in Human Rights: Essays 
on Justification and Applications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 
especially the essay "The Basis and Content of Human Rights." 
102 See generally J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (New York: Harvard, 1971) particularly at 
152-157 on the maximin rule. 
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the veil was lifted and would choose to maximize the minimum level of wealth 
for each individual. This would result in an initially egalitarian distribution of 
wealth. Rawls argues that this egalitarian distribution would only be departed 
from where it could be shown that the transfer of additional income to one 
individual would leave the least well-off individual in a better position - hence 
my term tempered reciprocal rights. 
In terms of the patent system, Rawls' approach would deny reward based on 
invention unless it could be shown that in giving such an advantage to an 
individual, the least well-off individuals in society would benefit. Thus, patents 
could only be supported if the economic gains from such a system would leave 
the poorest individuals in society better off. Again, we are left with a theory of 
patents that relies on economic assumptions which will be dealt with in the 
economic section. 
Pure Positivist Rights 
Pure positivist arguments for rights are easier to deal with as they rely solely 
on legislative sanction for their justification. Rights to patents can be justified 
wherever individuals vote for the establishment of a patent system. 
The difficulty with this approach is that there is not universal agreement 
among even elected developed country governments of the value of a patent 
system. In June 1976, the Canadian Minister of Commerce and Corporate 
Affairs, recommended the abolition of the patent system in 10 years if doubts 
remained about its utility. 103 Among developing countries, elected governments 
such as the Indian government have consistently rejected calls for the 
establishment of a comprehensive international patent system. 104 
Even if there were universal governmental agreement on the benefits of 
patents, the result could be challenged on the grounds that governments are not 
truly representative of all interests in their own society or even the interests of 
the majority. As will be demonstrated in the Political Perspectives section, game 
theory can be used to predict the predomination of groups with small but 
concentrated economic gains over groups with wider but more dispersed 
economic losses. 105 Positivist theory rests on the assumption that societally 
103 Committee on Transfer of Technology, supra note 19 at 3. 
104 India is not a member of the Paris Convention and grants only limited protection to 
foreign and domestic inventors. While a patent system is in place, it contains significant 
limitations from the inventors' perspective including the automatic licensing of food, 
medicines or chemical processes three years after the grant of a patent. 
105 In brief, economic gains from the patent system are arguably concentrated in corporate 
entities that rely on the system to maintain current profit levels. Given the central 
importance of the system to these corporate entities, it is rational for them to lobby 
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sanctioned agreements are "correct" agreements. Game theory predicts that a 
patent system may be established in the face of the majority of society passively 
opposing such a system with a concentrated minority actively lobbying in favour 
of patent protection. Thus, deficiencies in the democratic process call into 
question the validity of the positivist assumption that the agreed-to system is 
truly the system most individuals favour or benefit from. Once again, the only 
neutral standard against which to measure the patent system would appear to be 
its economic impact. 
Utilitarian Approach to Patent Protection 
Utilitarian justifications for patents share a common focus on the perceived 
economic benefits of the system. In broad terms, one commentator argues that 
the purpose of patent laws, "like that of most civilized laws, is an ever-more 
heightened, enjoyable and secure social existence." 106 This social existence is 
secured on the assumption that inventions benefit society and that exclusivity is 
the most efficient incentive to promote inventions. 107 
While utilitarian justifications were present even in the City State of Venice 
Patent Law, 108 it is only since the nineteenth century that they became the 
paramount justification for patent systems. Evidence of the shift can be found in 
the Austrian patent law adopted in 18 IO which stated "that inventors had neither 
any property rights in their invention, nor any rights to patents." 10<> Patents were 
justified only in terms of their contribution to economic development. The 
rudimentary international patent system agreed to at the Vienna Conference of 
government in an effort to maintain or strengthen the system. Even if the patent system 
produced even greater economic losses in society generally, the losses would be spread 
widely over consumers. Each individual consumer would be tempted to operate under 
the "free rider principle," knowing that their contribution to any campaign to abolish 
patents would likely have an insignificant effect. In other words, the "rational" consumer 
will defect by refusing to contribute to a lobbying effort. The best case outcome for the 
individual would be to have others contribute with the patent system being eliminated. 
The worst outcome would be for them to contribute with others cheating, resulting in an 
economic loss for them and no economic gain as there was insufficient lobbing to defeat 
the patent system. Thus, it is in each individual's rational interest to "cheat," leaving no 
consumer lobby and the corporate lobby dominant in determining whether there will be 
patent protection. 
106 G.R. Blakeney Jr., "Systems of Business Patents," (1990),30 Idea 355 at 355. 
107 Oddi argues in "The International Patent System and Third World Development: 
Reality or Myth?" [1987] Duke L.J. 831 at 837 that this argument has been largely 
intuitive for much of the 500 years that modern patents have been in existence. 
108 The first two of the Venetian goals (utility to society and the encouragement of 
inventive activity) were clearly utilitarian. See United Nations, The role of the patent 
system, supra note 5 at 44. 
109 Ibid. 
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1873 marked a key turning point as the justifications for patents focussed 
exclusively on economic arguments. 110 Patents were supported at the conference 
as a reward to inventors to give them an inducement to encourage inventive 
activity and to disclose secrets. 
While most countries with patent systems now focus their justifications on 
utilitarian arguments, the United States has, at least until recently, 111 retained a 
focus on rights-based justifications. 112 Evidence of this can be found in the 
retention of the first-to-invent system which has as its aim the reward of the true 
inventor, as opposed to the individual who first files for protection. Robert 
Rines, President of the Franklin Pierce Law Centre, provides clear, if somewhat 
bombastic, evidence that the individual rights approach in the United States is 
alive and well. Arguing that the absolute novelty (or first-to-file) doctrine used 
in most patent systems works against the American first-to-invent system, Rines 
states: 
It is not because the "absolute novelty" doctrine is at variance 
with our American system that the author urges the world to, 
at least, modify this doctrine. It is rather because this author 
believes the American understanding of the needs of the 
inventive process is an intellectually superior understanding ... 
As in all areas where freedom and the rights of individuals are 
to remain superior to the mere convenience of our 
administrators, it is admittedly more difficult to administer the 
American way or parts thereof. But that is the price of 
everything worthwhile in attaining individual rights. 113 
Utilitarian justifications for patents are all rooted in notions of economic 
110 Ibid. at 44-45. 
111 In March, 1987 the American delegation to the Third Session of the Committee of 
Experts (set up to review patent cooperation under the World Intellectual Property 
Organization) agreed to consider the adoption of a first-to-file registration system. This 
would replace the first-to-invent system currently in force in the United States that is 
philosophically grounded in the notion that the true inventor has a right to the fruits of 
their invention. Caution should be used in interpreting this concession as a wholesale 
change in philosophy as the American decision was partially rooted in an effort to obtain 
reciprocal concessions from other nations. By making this concession, the U.S. 
delegation hoped to convince other nations to widen the scope of patent protection to 
include the patenting of living microorganisms. 
112 The American support for the right of the inventor to protection has been relatively 
recent.. Benjamin Franklin argued that "as we enjoy great Advantages from the 
Inventions of others, we should be glad of an Opportunity to serve others by any 
Invention of ours, and this we should do freely and generously." Quoted in R.E. 
Berenbeim, supra, note 83 at 1. 
113 R.H. Rines, "Some Areas of Basic Difference Between United States Patent Law and 
That of the Rest of the World - and Why," (1987) 28 Idea 5 at 11. 
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efficiency. While utilitarian theories may differ on whether the final goal is the 
greatest good for the greatest number or the maximization of total economic 
wealth, they all demand that the system adopted produce the most economically 
efficient result in attaining the goal. Thus, support for any utilitarian theory of 
patent protection would have to be grounded in findings that the patent system 
was more efficient at producing its economic outcome than all alternative 
systems - from no patents to government sponsored invention. Once again, we 
are led to an economic analysis of patents as critical in justifying their existence. 
Conclusion 
Support for patent protection can be grounded in a range of theories on both 
the rights and utilitarian spectrums. With the exception, however, of the moral 
imperative natural law strand, all of these theories are grounded in an 
assumption or reasoning that views patents as an economically efficient system. 
Consequently, it is critical that the economic impact of patents be analyzed. 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis 
of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend 
instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it 
would be irresponsible on the basis of our present knowledge, to 
recommend abolishing it. 114 
Fritz Machlup, 1958 
Although economic arguments have been critical in justifying the existence of 
patent protection since the Venetian Patent Laws, 115 few resources have been 
devoted to testing the validity of these claims. Economic arguments for and 
against patents almost always consist of generalized allegations about categories 
of costs and benefits and rarely endeavour to quantify these variables. Indeed, 
the author has been unable to find any economic model that attempts to explain 
patent protection in terms other than lists of costs and benefits. 116 Consequently, 
n4 Quoted in Oddi, supra note 107 at 841-42. 
115 Recall that two of the four goals outlined in the Patent Statute of the City State of 
Venice in 1474 were general utility to society and the encouragement of inventive 
activity. See United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 44. 
116 In all the literature reviewed by the author including a number of economic texts, not 
one model for international patent protection was found. Carlos Braga (supra note 78) 
has developed an equation for the net welfare effects of a patent system in a small, 
developing country in which little invention takes place. However, the equation does not 
go far beyond a list of potential costs and benefits and a conclusion that if the costs 
exceed the benefits, a patent system should not be adopted. Braga notes that there is 
virtually no economic data to quantify each of his variables. 
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current economic analysis is limited to setting out potential costs and benefits of 
patent protection and attempting to use comparative economic development 
data, either between countries or at differing stages of a country's development, 
to evaluate the magnitude of these costs and benefits. 
The goal of the economic component of this paper is to determine whether it 
is possible to move beyond Malchup's recommendation and calculate the net 
economic cost or benefit of the establishment of an international patent system. 
In order to accomplish that goal, the analysis will be built in three stages. First, 
protection for an individual product in a closed economy will be assessed. 
Second, protection for a range of products will be assessed in the context of an 
open economy with all countries maintaining patent protection. Finally, the 
cumulative costs and benefits from differing country types will be assessed in 
determining the effect of global patent protection on total economic welfare. 
In each case, an effort will be made to separate direct costs and benefits in 
the adoption of a patent system from indirect effects - for example, the 
utilization of monopoly power to force purchasers to sign contracts agreeing to 
buy at the monopoly price beyond the life of the patent. Each of the indirect 
costs will be evaluated to determine the degree to which they can and have been 
mitigated through legislative sanction of such practices. 
Single Product Patent 
The first step in attempting to calculate the costs and benefits of an 
international patent system is to isolate the results of the imposition of a patent 
for a single product category (the sword) in a closed economy (Narnia). It is 
assumed that the only source of inventive activity and production is from within 
the country. It is further assumed that current inventiveness (sword 
development) is below the socially optimal level. 117 
Despite a number of efforts made by the author to develop such a model, all were 
quickly rejected by other economics students with whom the model was discussed. The 
inherent difficulty is that patent protection produces a host of potential influences on 
economic development, some positive and some negative. Given that virtually none of 
these influences have been quantified, it is difficult to begin to imagine what a graph 
might look like plotting years of patent protection against economic development. 
Developing such a model based on the current dearth of economic data is analogous to a 
person trying to draw a road map to an unmarked city on the map. Even if we know the 
city is on this continent and are constrained to existing roads (analogous to our 
generalized knowledge of potential economic costs and benefits) the chances of drawing 
a correct routing are small based on our current level of information. 
117 The socially optimal level is a subject of considerably controversy. As was noted in 
footnotes 97 and 98, it may differ greatly depending on the economic assumptions of 
various cultures. Even under a liberalized market, agreement does not exist as to what 
INTERNATIONAL PATENT REGIME 31 
Economic Benefits11S 
Sabatier sets out the general benefits of providing patent protection as 
follows: 
En matiere d'invention, Ia societe est au plus haut point 
interessee. Elle protege l'inventeur afin de stimuler le progres 
technique et de satisfaire ainsi aux besoins de ses membres. 
Elle s'efforce d'activer le developpement de l'economie dans 
le sens d'une production plus abondante a meilleur prix de 
revient, pour fabriquer davantage de biens repondant mieux a 
ses besoins. 119 
Sabatier's perceived increase in economic development is achieved through an 
increase in inventive activity that produces longer term economic development 
in the form of more efficient products. The increased inventive activity is 
achieved through two mechanisms: increased investment in inventive activity 
and increased knowledge. 
The increased investment in inventive activity [Variable A] is a response to 
a guarantee of economic reward for successful inventions during the period of 
patent protection. This causes both human and capital resources to shift to the 
relatively higher rewards being offered by the inventive sector. The increased 
level of invention is presumed to be needed because the market fails to produce 
the socially optimal level of inventions. Without protection for inventions, it is 
argued that insufficient resources will be invested in inventions. Williamson 
argues that "[t]he problem is that no one would have an incentive to invest in 
making inventions which could immediately be copied by everyone since the 
imitator would compete the price of the original down to a point that would 
deprive the inventor of any profits to compensate him for his costs of making the 
invention." 120 Thus, it is contended that insufficient resources will be devoted to 
Narnian sword research by the private sector because the government refuses to 
guarantee patent protection. 
In assessing the benefits of a patent system to investment in inventions, it 
the optimal rate of invention is. Economists such as Edith Penrose argue that a patent 
system may encourage too much invention in the sense that resources are drawn away 
from more productive sectors of the economy. Thus, it is possible that the socially 
optimal level of invention will be produced without resort to government incentives such 
as the establishment of a patent system. See E. Penrose, The Economics of the 
International Patent System (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1951), at 35-36. 
118 For a summary of all variables and equations utilized, see Appendix I. 
119 M. Sabatier, L'Exploitation des brevets d'invention et l'interet d'ordre economique 
(Paris: Centre d'Etudes Internationales de la Propriete Industrielle, 1976) at 2. 
120 J. Williamson, The Open Economy and the World Economy (New York: Basic Books, 
1983), at 280. 
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must be noted that not all inventiveness is the result of economic reward. 
Technological innovation did not begin with the development of the Venetian 
Patent Law in 1472. 121 Clearly invention would not cease if sword innovations 
were not granted patent protection in Narnia. In the modern setting, invention 
may be more reward-responsive than in Narnia, but given the importance of the 
corporation in determining where resources are focussed, it must be recognized 
that a significant factor in invention is the gratification obtained in the 
development of a useful product. 122 Thus, a certain level of invention would be 
attained without the need to introduce a patent system [Variable B]. 
The second benefit, increased knowledge [Variable C], is a function of the 
publication of detailed information about the invention, which might otherwise 
remain secret, in order to secure the patent. This information can be used to 
generate further inventive activity. Thus, by releasing the details of the new 
sword alloy, other Narnian inventors could more efficiently engage in further 
sword research. 
This benefit is also mitigated by the fact that, even under a patent system, 
the best option for the inventor would be to keep the technology secret and 
maintain a monopoly of unlimited duration [Variable D]. Thus, if an inventor 
were able to keep an invention secret while selling it, they would not apply for a 
patent. Edith Penrose notes: 
There is no way of determining whether or to what extent 
patents prevent the loss of new inventions and ideas to society 
because the inventors would otherwise carry their secrets to 
the grave. It is difficult to see why an inventor would go to the 
trouble of taking out a patent if the danger of imitation or of 
independent discovery of the same invention were slight. 123 
As a result, the economic activity from knowledge that would have been 
available in the absence of the patent system must be subtracted from the 
121 The levels of innovation and technological advancement during the Chow dynasty in 
China or the rule of Sesostris III in Egypt were as successful as any modern period at 
producing technological innovation. Yet, there is no evidence of monopoly grants in any 
of these societies. Indeed, even in modern times, the explosion in scientific knowledge 
and technological innovation in Renaissance Italy was not the result government 
guarantees of monopoly profits but of a higher pursuit of knowledge. Thus, it is possible 
that technological advancement is not primarily a function of economic reward but of the 
establishment of a culture conducive to the quest for knowledge. 
122 This can be extended to the corporation in certain instances as evidenced by the 
decision of Bavarian Motor Works not to enforce their patents for structural safety 
designs in the interests of allowing all car-makers to produce safer cars. [Information 
drawn from B.M.W. commercials on television and in the print media during 1992.] 
123 E. Penrose supra, note 117 at 34. 
INTERNATIONAL PATENT REGIME 33 
economic activity generated from knowledge under a patent system, in order to 
produce the net benefit. 
Economic Costs124 
The economic costs of patent protection can be broken down into two 
categories: procedural costs and monopoly costs. Procedural costs [Variable E] 
stem from the need to set up a system for judging whether the sword variations 
were significant enough to merit patent protection and from the legal costs of 
making, defending, and hearing claims of patent violations in a court system. 
Direct monopoly costs take three forms. The first is the underutilization of 
inventions [Variable F] that would have been available without the monopoly 
premium if there were no patent system. Assuming that the Narnian 
administrators could not separate out inventions that are the consequence of the 
patent system, sword inventors that otherwise would have made advances and 
been unable to charge monopoly prices for their swords are now able to do so. 
The second monopoly cost is the devotion of research expenditures to "inventing 
around" existing patents [Variable G]. Rather than building on existing 
knowledge, inventive efforts may be channelled toward duplicating existing 
inventions with different technology. The third potential monopoly cost is the 
overallocation of resources in applied research as compared with basic research 
[Variable H]. Given that it is only the useful applications of technology that are 
patented, this will shift resources away from the basic research sector. 125 It is 
possible, however, that the total level of basic research will actually be higher 
under the patent system than without it, given the general reward incentives 
offered by a patent system. 
While there are a number of other indirect costs associated with the 
patenting of a product, these are not the direct result of a monopoly system and 
may be mitigated by legislative action. The first of these indirect costs is the 
setting of the monopoly price well above even the monopolist profit maximizing 
level. The most extreme example of this practice is non-use [Variable I]. 
Leading sword makers may hold patents to a number of sword variations that 
they do not release as they would compete with an existing line of swords. 
124 I have relied heavily on the analysis of Samuel Oddi in developing a list of potential 
costs. See supra note 107 at 840-41. Again, for a summary of the variables and 
equations utilized, see Appendix. 
125 This may not hurt a country like Japan that historically imported basic research from 
centres such as Germany and the United States. However, in our Narnia model, no such 
research may be imported. Consequently there will be an overall monopoly cost in the 
form of an underallocation in basic research that would otherwise have generated 
economic activity. 
34 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Thus, society would be denied direct economic benefits from these patents. 
Non-use and price gouging, however, may be regulated through the 
establishment of compulsory licensing schemes or the revocation of patents that 
are not worked within a certain period of time. 126 
The second indirect cost is contractual agreements to extend monopoly 
power beyond the immediate scope of patent protection [Variable J]. Using 
their monopoly power, patent holders have attempted to extend protection 
periods beyond the scope of the patent, to limit use of patented items to a 
particular sector, to force the granting back of technological innovations gained 
in using the patented item, and to agree not to contest the validity of the 
patent. 127 The Narnian government, however, would be free to enact legislation 
preventing the use of such practices as a number of nations have done. 12s 
In deciding what level of patent protection to accord swords, Narnia should 
set the number of years of patent protection at the level where the total benefits 
[TB= (A-B) + (C-D)] exceeds the total costs [TC= (E+F+G+H) + (I+J)] by the 
greatest amount. If benefits never exceed costs, patent protection should not be 
granted. Given the relatively different time periods needed to recover 
investments for different products, it would be probable that the optimum 
number of years of protection would differ from product to product. 129 
126 Compulsory licensing is a provision that forces patent holders to negotiate reasonable 
licence fees for users of their patented technology. Revocation is the overturning of a 
patent, here on the grounds of non-use of the patent. The Paris Convention allows the use 
of compulsory licensing and revocation though it insists that at least four years pass from 
the filing date for the patent to the issuance of a compulsory licence. Section 83 of the 
Indian Patents Act (1970) is an example of a national provision for revocation or 
compulsory licensing. It provides that "patents are granted to encourage inventions and 
to secure that the inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest 
extent that is reasonably practicable without undue delay." Fifty-five nations maintained 
provisions for compulsory licences in the case of a failure to work the patent in a United 
Nations survey conducted in 1975 (see supra note 5 at 12.) Other measures for dealing 
with non-use include licences of right, which may be imposed provided non-use is 
shown, and automatic lapsing provisions, which provide that a patent will automatically 
lapse after a specified period of time unless evidence of patent use is provided. 
127 For example, the makers of Nutrasweet attempted to force purchasers of their product 
to agree to continue buying the product at monopoly prices after the expiry of the patent 
in return for immediate use of the product. Examples of other abuses of patent 
monopolies are chronicled in the United Nations Report on The role of the patent system, 
supra note 5. 
128 The United States has legal sanctions against all the practices described. For a more 
complete list of legislative responses to the abuse of patent monopolies, see ibid. at 21-
23. 
129 Estimates for the time needed to recover research costs for a new pharmaceutical 
product range up to fifteen years. See generally T.G. Field Jr., "Pharmaceuticals and 
Intellectual Property: Meeting Needs Throughout the World," (1990) 31 Idea 3. Thus, a 
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Even if Narnia concludes it is operating at below the optimal level of 
innovation for a given product, it should be noted that patent protection is not 
the only option available to the government to increase the level of innovation. 
Dasgupta and Stoneman 130 suggest two other ways in which the socially optimal 
level of innovation could be met. The first would be the direct government 
production of knowledge with the knowledge being distributed free to all. The 
second would be the use of subsidies to encourage the private production of 
knowledge. In practice, most industrialized countries use both of these methods 
as a supplement to the patent system. Another possibility is described by Ulf 
Anderfelt in his classic work International Patent Legislation and Developing 
Countries. 131 Anderfelt makes reference to Alexander Hamilton's proposal of 
federal rewards paid to inventors for useful discoveries with the inventions then 
being available to all. 132 This system continues to be utilized in China for 
Chinese nationals. 133 Thus, in theory, it would be possible to generate any 
desired level of invention through the use of non-patent mechanisms. 
Single Country Patent System 
When moving to the analysis of a patent system imposed over a range of 
products in an open economy, two key variables change. The first is that the 
total cost/total benefit equation is no longer maximized for each individual 
product [Variable K]. While some countries maintain broad categories with 
different levels of patent protection, 134 current economic knowledge would not 
allow an accurate assessment to be made of the costs and benefits of each 
specific item in determining its appropriate patent protection period. Thus, some 
products would be overprotected by a common patent protection period and 
others would be underprotected. This would create economic losses in the form 
of misallocation of inventive resources. 
The second variable is the possible import and export of patented goods, 
investment, and knowledge in the open economy [Variable L]. Given the 
socially optimal level of patent protection in a closed economy such as Narnia for a given 
level of pharmaceutical innovation may be considerably higher than the socially optimal 
level for sword protection due to the relatively longer development period for 
pharmaceuticals. 
130 P. Dasgupta and P. Stoneman quoted in Braga, supra, note 78 at 254. 
l3I U. Anderfelt, International Patent Legislation and Developing Countries (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). 
132 Ibid. at 62-63. 
133 See Kay supra note 3, at 337-38. 
134 For example, India maintains a different period of patent protection for food and 
medicines than for other products. Egypt maintains different patent protection period for 
chemical processes than other products. 
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differing resource endowments of each country including "inventive" 
intellectual resources, it is important to analyze the impact of a patent system on 
different types of countries. The patent product exporting, neutral, and 
importing countries will be examined in turn. Patent exporting countries are 
those that are strong exporters of inventive technology. Patent neutral countries 
are those that export and import inventive goods but have an equal balance of 
trade on these goods. Patent importing countries are those that import inventive 
goods into their economy. 
Patent Product Exporter 
An intellectual property exporting country such as the United States would 
obtain additional gains in four forms. The first would be revenues from the 
export of their intellectual property products to other countries which now have 
protection. The second would be increased activity in the inventive sector 
creating technological advances as a response to the guaranteed access to 
markets larger than the home market. This would represent an addition to 
variable A in the closed economy as it becomes more lucrative to invest in the 
invention sector given the larger market [Variable Awl· The third benefit would 
be gains in knowledge from patent information around the wodd. This 
represents an increase in the magnitude of variable C in the closed economy 
[Variable Cw]. The final gain comes as a result of the fact that even patent 
exporters import some goods, consequently they would have access to inventive 
technology otherwise unavailable in the closed economy and would generate 
additional economic activity. 
Against these gains are a potential outflow of investment in the open 
economy. Large patent exporting countries like the United States and Germany 
are usually exporters of capital for inventive operations in the form of branch 
plants conducting research and development in other countries [Variable M]. 
This net outflow of investment need not represent a cost to the patent exporting 
country. Presumably the primary reason for investment is the higher rate of 
return obtainable in other countries. Thus, assuming profits can be repatriated, 
the exporting country need not be left worse off. 
Patent Product Neutral 
The patent neutral country would have an equilibrium between patent 
exports and imports that leave the trade gains from patents neutral. The country 
would experience, however, the three other gains available to the patent 
exporting country, gains in the form of increased internal investment, 
knowledge, and direct technology access. 
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Another potential gain to the patent product neutral country would be 
external investment in the patent sector that would not be available in a closed 
economy. This external investment would generate additional economic activity 
in the patent neutral country. In theory, it would be possible that external 
in vestment would be attracted even in the absence of patent protection, given 
that ability to export to countries with patent protection. In practice, 
multinational corporations, which are the critical players in these investment 
decisions, are reluctant to invest in countries without "adequate" levels of patent 
protection. 135 
It should be noted that the impact of this additional investment is not 
entirely positive. Assuming that profits could be repatriated by the country 
which invested the capital, the patent neutral country would see an outflow of 
funds in the form of dividend profit payments from research conducted in the 
patent neutral country [Variable N]. 
Patent Product Importer 
The patent importer has an outflow of funds exactly equal to the inflow to 
patent product exporters in the form of resources devoted to purchasing the 
inventive technology. The patent importer, however, receives gains in three 
forms: increased inventive activity, increased knowledge, and direct access to 
technology which produces economic gains [Variable 0]. 136 The first two of 
these gains are likely to be extremely small in the importing country since as a 
large importer of patents, it is at a comparative disadvantage in the development 
of inventive goods. 137 
As with the patent neutral country, there are potential gains from external 
investment in the inventive sector of the patent importing country. Again, this 
135 For example, investment in research and development in the Canadian pharmaceutical 
industry has increased since the introduction of stronger patent legislation [PMAC Fact 
Sheet No. 3, 1991]. Whether this increased investment will be sustained when the 
agreement between the multinational pharmaceutical companies and the federal 
government runs out remains to be seen. 
136 Michael Gadbaw and Timothy Richards engage in a brief discussion of how these 
variables might be measured in their study of intellectual property rights in Argentina, 
Brazil, India, Mexico, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. However, they do not attempt to 
estimate the value of these variables. See Intellectual Property Rights: Global 
Consensus, Global Conflict? (Boulder: Westview, 1988) at 97-102. 
137 A comparative disadvantage exists for country A when other countries have a 
relatively higher endowment in inventive resources than country A. Thus, while there 
may be an increase in knowledge and a potential for increased invention given access to 
the global market, a country like Burkina Faso would be unable to take advantage of 
these factors given their relative poverty in inventive resources in terms of the 
development of products that would be internationally competitive. 
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gain is likely to be small if the importing country lacks the educational 
infrastructure to support such investment. Furthermore, this gain must be 
balanced against an outflow of dividend profits reaped from the external 
investment in the inventive sector. 
The total gains and losses are summarized below with a breakdown of the 
impact of these costs and benefits for each of the three classes of countries. 
Total Benefits Total Costs 
Patent Exporting Country 
(A-B) + (C-D) (L+N+O) + (E+F+G+H) + (I+J)138+ (K+M) 
(Aw+Cw) 
Patent Neutral Country 
(A-B) + (C-D) + (M+O) + 
(Aw+Cw) 
(E+F+G+H) + (l+J) + (K+N) 
Patent Importing Country (A-B) + (C-D) + (M+O) + (E+F+G+H) + (I+J) + (K+L+N) (Aw+Cw) 
Global Patent System 
When calculating the cumulative effects of the costs and benefits of 
individual countries in a global patent system, one reduction in costs and one 
additional cost emerges. The reduction in costs comes in the form of a lessening 
of the individual administrative costs (Variable E) of each country through the 
adoption of a common patent system. 139 The additional cost is the misallocation 
of inventive activity with the acceptance of a common patent protection period. 
This misallocation is the global equivalent of variable Kon the domestic level. 140 
Just as the setting of a common period within a country overprotects some 
products and underprotects others, the establishment of a global period would 
create similar costs as differing countries have differing optimal levels of 
protection assuming different relative allocations of inventive resources. 
When calculating the overall equation for global patent protection with a 
common period of protection, the variables L, M, and N disappear as they are 
equal and offsetting as they represent direct transfers from one country to 
another. These variables, however, will be evaluated as it may be argued that 
even if global welfare is maximized by the adoption of a patent system, it could 
not be recommended if losses were concentrated in a particular class of countries 
and the gainers were unwilling to subsidize those losses. Consequently, we are 
left with the following equations: 141 
l3S Recall that in all cases, the (I+J) costs are potentially mitigable through legislation. 
139 E. will be used to represent economic gains in administration and reduced litigation 
from the establishment of common patent rules. 
14° K. represents global costs of misallocation of inventive resources from the adoption of 
a common protection period. 
141 Where is the sum of the variables of all countries and (I, + 1) are mitigable through 
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Total Global Benefits = (A1- B1) + (C1-Di) + (01) + (Aw1+ Cw1) 
Total Global Costs = (E1 - Ew) + (F1 + G1 + H1) + (I1+ 11) + (K1) + (Kw) 
Transfers = M1, and N1 = 0 
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While this model is no doubt incomplete, it is useful to attempt to break 
down the potential costs and benefits of a global patent system in order to place 
some order on existing economic data. No comprehensive economic assessment 
has been made of the costs and benefits of the system. 142 Consequently, it is 
necessary to assess the sparse economic data available for the assessment of 
each of these variables to determine whether an assessment can be made as to 
the merits of such a system. 
Evaluating the Variables 143 
Total Benefits 
Variables Ar, Br, C1 , andDr 
It is a sad commentary on the state of current economic knowledge that the 
domestic variables A through D have not been comprehensively evaluated in 
any country for which the author has been able to find information. The 
challenge made by then Commerce and Corporate Affairs Minister Bryce 
MacKasey in June 1976 that the patent system be abolished in Canada if further 
studies confirmed doubts about its economic utility has not been answered.144 In 
short, no detailed econometric analysis has been done which separates the 
additional domestic investment and knowledge produced by a patent system that 
otherwise would have already been present in the economy. 
Variable Or 
In evaluating the direct technology gains from access to patents (variable 
0 1), some work has been done in developing countries in an attempt to measure 
legislation. 
142 The closest we have to this would be the seminal 1951 work of E. Penrose, The 
Economic of the International Patent System (see supra note 117). However, Penrose 
focuses on the costs and benefits of such a system to the developing countries and makes 
no effort to quantify these variables. She simply states her opinion that the magnitude of 
the cost variables would be relatively high and the magnitude of the benefit variables 
would be relatively low. 
143 The reader may wish to refer to the Appendix which contains a list of all the variables 
for ease of reference. 
144 See Committee on Transfer of Technology, supra note I 9 at 3. 
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the difference in development patterns between countries with strong patent 
protection and countries with weak patent protection. The most comprehensive 
study was undertaken by Arman Kirim of the patent-free pharmaceutical 
industry in Turkey .145 Kirim states, "it can convincingly be argued that abolition 
has not had a 'negative technology flow' impact." 146 In fact, Kirim found that 
foreign pharmaceuticals were often introduced faster into the Turkish market 
than elsewhere given less stringent testing requirements in Turkey. While 
Kirim's study is comprehensive, it focusses exclusively on only one type of 
product. Consequently, it is difficult to draw analogies to an entire system of 
patent protection. 
A broader, though far less thorough, study is the 1981 United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development Report, Examination of the Economic, 
Commercial and Developmental Aspects of Industrial Property in the Transfer 
of Technology to Developing Countries. 147 The study reviewed the experience of 
developing countries that significantly weakened their patent laws, largely in 
response to the 1975 United Nations Report that found the patent system was not 
working in their interest. 148 The study suggests that "the drop in foreign patent 
applications has not been accompanied by a decrease in imported technology to 
these countries. Trends in transfer of technology agreements (Argentina and 
India) or direct foreign investment (Columbia, India, and Mexico) suggest that 
foreign technology has continued to flow into these countries." 149 While 
technology may have continued to flow into these countries, the study does not 
provide a list of similarly-situated countries that maintained a patent system and 
their levels of technology transfer. Thus, we can conclude that technology 
transfer is not entirely the product of a patent system, but are unable to calculate 
the degree to which patent protection promotes such transfer. 
Two additional points must be made in examining the value of variable Ot. 
The first is the existence of rigidities in the technology market that might restrict 
the flow of technology even with the adoption of a patent system (thus reducing 
the overall value of Ot). The second is the impact on the total supply of 
145 Since 1961, Turkey has refused to accord patent protection. to the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
146 A.S. Kirim, "Reconsidering Patents and Economic Development: A Case Study of the 
Turkish Pharmaceutical Industry," (1985) 13 World Development 219 at 229. 
147 UNCT AD, Examination of the Economic, Commercial and Developmental Aspects of 
Industrial Property in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries. Review of 
Recent Trends in Patents in Developing Countries, UNCTAD, 1981, UN Doc. 
TD/B/C.6/AC.5 [hereinafter Economic, Commercial and Development Aspects]. 
148 United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5. 
149 UNCTAD, Economic, Commercial and Development Aspects, supra footnote 147 at 
iv. 
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technology if one country acts as a free rider in refusing to adopt a patent system 
while utilizing the technology produced by countries with patent systems in 
place. 
On the first point, the United Nations Report on The Role of the Patent 
System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries found that 
imperfections in the technology market were perhaps the most important factor 
in the limited utilization of existing technical knowledge in developing 
countries. 150 Theoretically, these rigidities could be corrected., however, if they 
were not then the value of variable Ot might be very low as the existence of a 
patent system would not be key in determining whether access could be obtained 
to this technology. 
The second point is based on the flawed argument that, "[m]oreover, no 
matter what the cost of [technological] development, its use by others does not 
diminish the supply of technology to its originator or to anybody else." This 
point is strictly true. If a single country were to abolish its patent system, it 
would still be able to review the patent information of all the other countries 
(given the requirement that patent information be published) and copy this 
information in producing goods. This would not diminish the supply of existing 
technology. What is in the individual interest of one country, however, is not 
necessarily in the interests of all. If all countries were to rely on the publication 
of technological information from the patent systems of other countries, there 
would be no such information. The "cheating" pattern that appears to work in 
the interests of a single country falls apart if all try to act in the same manner. 
Furthermore, the "pirating" of technology from other countries will not 
reduce the existing base of technological development, but it could reduce future 
development. Variables Awt and Cwt would be reduced for every country that 
pulled out of a patent system. Thus, in making an overall assessment of variable 
ot, we find that patents may not be critical in determining technology flows, but 
that to the extent that technology flows are patent-related, global costs would 
result from the pirating of technology. 
Variables Aw1 and Cwr 
The value of increased economic activity resulting from higher levels of 
internal investment (Awt) and greater access to knowledge (Cwt) as a result of 
guaranteed access to a global patent market also lack hard economic data. 
Supporters of an international patent system like Richard Brennan, President of 
the International Anticounterfeiting Coalition, argue that "adequate and effective 
150 United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 31. 
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intellectual property rights protection is fundamental both to competitiveness 
and to increased economic development around the world." 151 No study of 
which the author is aware, however, examines the extent to which guaranteed 
access to foreign markets factors into investment decisions of companies in 
invention exporting countries. Similarly, it is difficult to calculate the global 
benefits of the common knowledge bank that would be the result of an 
international patent system. 
Opponents of an international patent system have also made broad 
generalizations without providing data to support their claims. Edith Penrose 
argues that the "incentive effect on foreign industry of a monopoly in one 
additional market would usually be negligible." 152 However, as has already been 
pointed out, the Penrose argument is flawed in that it fails to consider the effect 
of multiple country defections from the patent system of global inventiveness. 
Thus, while the impact on global research of the defection of Mongolia may be 
slight, the cumulative impact of the defection of the entire developing world 
would likely be significant. 153 
Total Costs 
Variables E1 and Ew 
Variables Et and Ew are quantifiable, though the author was unable to find 
an estimate of the value of these variables. Administration costs can be broken 
down into the direct operating costs of individual patent offices and the 
deadweight loss to the economy of the activities of lawyers in making 
applications and litigating patent protection. While the direct administration 
costs of a patent office are relatively small, 154 the costs of legal support for 
applications and post application litigation is considerably larger. The 
application costs of filing a patent in a single country are generally under $200 
151 R. M. Brennan, "Intellectual Property Aspects of Canada-U.S. Competitiveness in the 
World Context," (1988) Can.-U.S. L.J. 263. 
152 Penrose, supra note 117 at 113. 
153 It can be argued that the free transfer of technological information to the developing 
world might be an appropriate form of foreign aid to foster economic development. 
Thus, using a cycle theory of patents, countries would gradually strengthen their patent 
structures as they became economically more developed. This pattern of gradual 
strengthening in response to economic development occurred in both the United States 
and Japan. For a discussion of the Japanese experience, see C. Mackley, "The Role of the 
Patent System in Technology Transfer: The Japanese Experience," (1987) 26 Col. J. 
Transnat' 1 L. 131. 
154 The World Intellectual Property Organization administered the terms of the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (which includes the preliminary determination of patentability of an 
invention) for about 18 million Swiss francs (about $15 million Canadian) in addition to 
the nominal fees for the processing of individual applications. 
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American. 155 One author has estimated, however, that the full legal costs of 
filing the necessary five patents to protect a single product in ten countries at 
$50,000 U.S. 156 This does not take into consideration the litigation costs 
associated with defending and challenging patents. 
These costs would be significantly reduced through the establishment of a 
common patent system (variable Ew). Lawyers would only be able to charge for 
their knowledge of one set of patent laws - the global standard. Furthermore, 
only one application would be required rather than the existing system of one 
per country. 157 Post-application litigation costs could also be reduced as 
challenges could only be made under the international patent system, and not 
under a range of national patent laws. While the value of Et minus Ew is not 
insignificant, it would represent a considerable advance over current costs of Et· 
Both, however, represent a cost when compared against the option of no patent 
system at all. 
Variables F1 , G, and H, 
As with variables At through Dt, it is disappointing that so little research has 
been done into the economic costs of the underutilization of inventions 
otherwise available, research devoted to "inventing around" and overallocation 
resources to applied research. Given the lack of hard economic data, it is 
difficult to assess the basis on which both proponents and opponents of an 
international patent system claim such a system would be either of huge 
economic benefit or a disaster. 
Variables 11 and11 
Although these variables are mitigable with appropriate legislative action, 
they are perceived to be among the greatest costs of the establishment of a patent 
system. Criticisms of price gouging and non-use (variable 11) and of contractual 
abuses of monopoly powers (variable J1) are at the heart of many of the critiques 
155 See United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 60 for a full, if 
somewhat dated, fee listing. 
156 Blair, quoted in Field, supra note 129 at 22. 
157 Although the Patent Cooperation Treaty allows application to a central body, this is 
only the first stage in the patent process. Applications must then be pursued in each of 
the countries in which the applicant desires protection and are evaluated independently in 
each of those countries according to national law. The exceptions to the one application 
per country rule would be the European Economic Community, the Scandinavian Patent 
Union and the African and Malagasy Industrial Property Office for which one application 
is sufficient for all member countries. 
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of the existing patent structure and its impact on developing countries.158 In 
attempting to assess the importance of these variables, it is also essential that the 
degree to which they are a function of the patent system and the degree to which 
they are mitigable are also examined. 
Price gouging and non-use (variable I1) are particularly visible and have 
been the focus of much of the criticism of existing patent structures. 159 The 
effects of price gouging are not limited to developing countries. In 1973, the 
British Monopolies Commission found that the British subsidiary of Swiss 
pharmaceutical giant Hoffmann-La Roche AG was paying $925 U.S. per 
kilogram for the active ingredient in Librium and Valium which could be 
purchased in Italy for $22.50 US per kilogram. 160 On the issue of non-use, the 
United Nations found that 81 percent of American patents in Mexico and 94.5 
percent of Japanese patents in that country were not worked. 161 In an earlier 
1974 study, the United Nations found that the products of between 90 and 95 
percent of patents in developing countries were not used in those countries. 162 
The inference is made from statistics such as these that the reason the patents are 
not worked is the fact that many of them are taken out to prevent competing 
products from being introduced in the market. Thus, the country is denied both 
the benefits of the new technology and still must pay the monopoly price. 
Both the price gouging and non-use arguments assume that, in the absence 
of a patent system, such practices would not occur, or would be significantly 
reduced. Kirim's findings in Turkey, however, call these conclusions into 
question. 163 Kirim found that in the patent-free Turkish pharmaceutical industry, 
the imported price of selected raw materials sampled ranged from 274 percent of 
the world price to 3586 percent of the world price. In a similar sample of 
imported active ingredients, prices ranged from 171 percent of the world price to 
25,416 percent of the world price. Thus, price gouging may be primarily a 
function of the oligopolistic nature of the inventive industry as well as rigidities 
in the international market, and not a product of the patent system. 
Kirim came to similar conclusions with respect to non-use. All 
pharmaceuticals in Turkey must obtain a product licence. Of the 20,000 product 
158 See for example Anderfelt, supra note 131 c. 2, 3. 
159 For example, Vaitsos has focussed his criticism of the patent system in the 
pharmaceutical sector on price gouging and related monopolistic practices. See "Patents 
Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries." (1972-73) 9 Journal of Development 
Studies 71. 
160 The example is taken from United Nations, The role of the patent supra note 5 at 58. 
161 UNCTAD, Economic, Commercial and Developmental Aspects, supra note 147 at 22. 
162 United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 42. 
163 See Kirim, supra note 146 at 221-226. 
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licences that had been taken out, Kirim found only 1482 or 7.41 percent were 
actually being marketed. This figure is well within the range of non-use of 
patents in Mexico. 164 Thus, it appears that non-use is not primarily a function of 
the presence or absence of a patent system. 
With respect to variable Jt (contractual abuses of monopoly powers) it has 
been argued that the granting of a patent provides the holder with monopolistic 
leverage to extend the patent beyond the formal terms of patent protection. 
Examples of such contractual abuses include agreements to extend monopoly 
prices beyond the legislative period of protection, to limit the use of patented 
items to a particular sector, to force the granting back of technological 
innovations gained in using the patented item, and to agree not to contest the 
validity of the patent. 
Again, it is possible that many of these potential costs are the consequence 
of oligopolistic power that may be present in an industry and not the existence of 
a patent system. Kirim found that "even when licensing agreements are not 
based on patents, as in the case of the Turkish pharmaceutical industry, all of 
these restrictive conditions can still be included in the contracts." 165 Similar 
practices have been utilized in American contracts with Indian importers. 166 
This is because of the oligopolistic power of the American companies that 
allows them to set the terms of trade with their Indian counterpart. Thus, it is the 
oligopolistic power and not the patent system that would have to be challenged 
if contractual abuses of monopoly power are to be avoided. 
Consequently, patents may be a relatively small component of the overall 
power base of oligopolistic industries. In the 1970s, the United Nations 
Commission on Trade and Development - dominated by developing countries -
saw patents as the key element of monopoly power in developing countries. By 
1982 the patent was seen as playing a relatively secondary role in monopoly 
power. In their 1982 Guidelines on Technology Issues in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector in the Developing Countries, the United Nations Commission on Trade 
and Development concluded that: 
Trade marks have become a source of market power in the 
pharmaceutical industry, perhaps of greater importance than 
patents .... Trade names, i.e. the name identifying the enterprise, 
although less important than trade marks in the marketing 
policies of the pharmaceutical companies, also play an 
important role in sales promotion. The reputation of certain 
companies has been an additional factor in securing the loyalty 
164 UNCTAD, Economic, Commercial and Developmental Aspects, supra note 147 at 22. 
l65 Kirim, supra note 146 at 229. 
166 United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 20. 
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of the medical profession .... Once the brand name is 
established, competitors entering the market after the expiry of 
the patent period find it difficult to compete successfully with 
the established brand, even if they offer the product at sharply 
reduced prices. 167 
By 1988, a United Nations Conference entitled Technology Policies for 
Development and Selected Issues for Action failed to make any significant 
reference to the patent system in technology policies. Instead, the conference 
focus was on the establishment of free trade zones and other methods of 
attracting foreign investment. 168 
Overarching any discussion of price gouging, non-use, and contractual 
abuses of monopoly power is the realization that all of these abuses may be dealt 
with through legislation. They are not a direct function of the patent system. 
For example, article 16 of the Zambian Industrial Development Act restricts 
contractual monopoly power in that "[a] contract for the transfer of technology 
and expertise shall not contain any condition: ... (e) Which restricts the volume or 
structure of production; [or] (f) Which limits the ways in which any patent or 
other know-how may be used." 169 In short, while these abuses often have severe 
economic consequences for developed and developing countries, they are not a 
direct consequence of the imposition of a patent system and cannot be counted 
as costs in determining whether or not to establish a global patent system. 170 
Variables K1 and Kw 
Given the scarcity of econometric analysis of the optimal period of patent 
protection, it should not be surprising that it is not possible to calculate either the 
misallocation costs of a common protection period for each country or of the 
adoption of a global patent protection period. Assuming such econometric tools 
167 UNCTAD, Guidelines on technology issues in the pharmaceutical sector in the 
developing countries (New York: United Nations, 1982) at 10. 
168 UNCTAD, Technology Policies for Development and Selected Issues for Action 
UNCTAD, 1988 UN Doc. TD!fT49 at 10. 
169 UNCTAD, Control of restrictive practices in transfer of technology transactions: 
Selected principal regulations, policy guidelines and case law at the national and 
regional levels UNCTAD, 1988 UN Doc. TD!fT94 at 9. 
170 It is assumed that the international patent system would not prevent member states 
from taking such actions. The Paris Convention as currently constituted does place one 
significant limitation on revocation and compulsory licensing in the face of non-use. 
Articles 5(A)(2), 5(A)(3), and 5(A)(4) require members to wait at least four years from 
the application for the patent before taking such action. One possible balancing provision 
in the adoption of an international patent system might be the modification of these 
articles to allow the immediate suspension of patent rights where there is evidence that 
the patent holder is acting outside the provisions of the patent grant. 
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were to become available, it may be possible to fine tune an international patent 
system with different protection periods for different products. On the basis of 
current economic knowledge, however, neither these costs nor the fine tuning of 
an international system could be accomplished. 
One note should be made about the likely level of protection for an 
international system. It has been assumed in the Treaty Patent System and 
GATT negotiations that the protection period would be in the range of 15 to 20 
years. 171 Assuming all countries participated in the common patent system, it 
would seem logical that a shorter period of protection be adopted. Given 
guaranteed access to greater numbers of people, the number of years required to 
recover research investments would presumably decline. By adopting the 15 to 
20 year range, there would be an implicit assumption that the current level of 
global invention is too low and that guaranteed market access is required to 
increase that level of invention. As Penrose has noted, this assumption is open 
to debate. 172 
Transfer Implications 
Although the net impact of transfer costs on global welfare are, by 
definition, zero, consideration should be given to their distributional 
consequences in order to identify whether there are any major gainers or losers 
from the establishment of an international patent system. 
Variable L 
The calculation of the flows of patented goods is made easier by the 
existence of data on the nationality of patents around the world. A 1975 United 
Nations study helps to demonstrate the sharp split in patent ownership: 
An overwhelming majority (84 percent) of the patents in 
developing countries is owned by foreigners, mainly 
multinational corporations of five developed market-economy 
countries .... The nationals of developing countries hold in their 
own countries no more than 1 percent of the world stock of 
patents, and in other countries, no more than about two thirds 
of 1 percent of foreign-owned patents. These countries have 
plainly been on the periphery of the patent system. 173 
17 1 See The Historical Perspective Chapter for a more complete discussion of these 
negotiations. 
172 Penrose, supra note 117 at 128. 
173 United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 42. 
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The mere fact that a country or group of countries has a comparative advantage 
in producing a particular type of goods is not necessarily evidence of a problem. 
Canada is almost wholly reliant on Morocco and Spain for its production of 
clementines. Developing countries are gaining a growing hold on the world's 
textile markets. Dependence on foreign technology, however, is often seen in a 
different light than dependence on other goods. 
Among relatively developed countries such as Canada, there is a fear that 
unless they maintain competitiveness in the technological sectors, they will be 
consigned to acting as providers of unprocessed and semi-processed resources. 
This view is buttressed by economic theories about the existence of a learning 
curve in technological industries. 174 It is argued that by investing in 
technological industries a critical mass of technological innovation can be 
generated. Once generated, this mass feeds on experience gained to make 
further technological advances that foster more research; the country begins 
"riding the curve" without the introduction of additional resources in the 
technological sector. Thus, if it were determined that the maintenance of a 
strong domestic technological sector was key to the maintenance of quality jobs, 
there would likely be objection to the imposition of a global patent system that 
would favour economies that are currently innovation-intensive. 
Variable M 
The significance of investment that flows as a consequence of patent 
protection has been questioned by a number of economists. Penrose argues that 
"the evidence does seem to support the proposition that in by far the greater 
number of cases the willingness of a country to grant patents on inventions 
already patented and worked abroad is of no great importance one way or 
another as an inducement or obstacle to foreign investment."175 Penrose's view 
is supported by a 1981 United Nations study that examined the effects of the 
weakening of patent legislation in a number of developing countries in the early 
1970s. The study found that compound annual investment rates were 
comparable in the pre and post reform periods. 176 The study, however, does not 
compare the growth rates of these countries with similarly situated states that 
maintained strong patent regimes. Thus, while there is some doubt about the 
174 American economist Michael Porter of is one of the current proponents of this theory. 
See, for example, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990). 
175 E. Penrose "International patenting and the less-developed countries" (1973) 83 The 
Economic Journal 768 at 775. 
176 See UNCTAD, Economic, Commercial and Developmental Aspects, supra note 147 at 
14-20. 
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investment benefits resulting from patent protection, there is insufficient 
economic data to make a firm judgement about the magnitude of investment 
flows and their responsiveness to the strength of a national patent system. 
Variable N 
The calculation of the flow of dividends resulting from patent-related 
investment suffers from the same problems of measurement as the calculation of 
investment flows. While it is possible to calculate the value of dividend profit 
flows from each country, the extent to which these flows would be present in the 
absence of a patent system has not been calculated. Consequently, no clear 
assessment can be made of the value of these flows. 
Conclusion 
Given the lack of economic data available to calculate the value of virtually 
all of the variables set out in the equation, only three relatively weak conclusions 
may be drawn. The first is that general evidence suggests that the patent system 
is not as important in determining levels of economic development as was once 
thought. International market rigidities and the presence of oligopolistic 
industries may serve to dampen any benefits or costs from the adoption of an 
international patent system. 
The second conclusion is that among the variables for which there is data, 
there is some evidence that they may not be as significant as the proponents and 
opponents of the system proclaim. Thus, the benefits and losses may both be 
smaller than originally assumed by the two opposing camps. 
The final, and overriding conclusion, is that there is insufficient economic 
data on each of the individual variables to make any firm conclusion about the 
fostering or abandonment of efforts to establish a global patent system with a 
universal patent. Thus, we have not really moved beyond Malchup's statement 
in 1958 that we have insufficient data to recommend for or against the 
establishment of a patent system. This view has been supported by two recent 
studies in the field. In 1985, Arman Kirim noted in his study of the Turkish 
pharmaceutical industry that "notwithstanding criticisms of the system, the 
actual economic implications of patents is still an unresolved issue because the 
existing empirical work on the subject is not yet sufficient."177 In 1989, Carlos 
Braga came to a similar conclusion in finding that "[t]here is no a priori strong 
evidence that [developing] countries will necessarily benefit or lose from a 
177 Kirim, supra note 146 at 219. 
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reform of their intellectual property systems." 178 While the examination of each 
of the costs and benefits has cast doubt as to the magnitude of both the costs and 
benefits often alleged by proponents and opponents of an international patent 
system, the current level of economic knowledge is far from the point where it 
would be possible to make even an educated guess as to whether the benefits of 
such a system would outweigh the losses. 
While there is insufficient economic data to make a recommendation on the 
establishment of an international patent system, it has been noted that many 
countries have altered their intellectual property laws in response to their stage 
of economic development. Damschroder has observed that early intellectual 
property protection in the United States was limited to works authored by 
American citizens and was expanded only gradually over the next 100 years. 179 
A similar pattern of evolution in protection has been observed in Japan by 
Mackley. He notes that "[t]he Japanese patent system has evolved at times to 
comply with changing needs of the economy." 180 While there may be no 
economic data to justify such evolving standards, the fact that two of the largest 
inventive nations once restricted patent protection would give cause for 
developing nations to argue that they should also be allowed to gradually evolve 
their protection. 
If such a strategy were to be adapted to an international patent system, it 
might establish a universal patent but allow individual countries to alter their 
period of protection according to their stage of economic development. Thus, 
countries with more developed economies would be expected to subsidize less 
developed countries through free access to the inventive knowledge and related 
technologies. As these countries became more developed, they would be 
expected to improve their patent protection to feed the general pool of 
knowledge. 
Having failed to find an economic justification for or against patent 
protection, political explanations will be examined in an effort to explain the 
existence of different phases of development in domestic patent systems. The 
same political factors will be analyzed in an effort to determine if it is likely the 
world is moving to the development of an international patent system. 
11s Braga, supra note 78 at 264. 
179 M. L. Damschroder, "Intellectual Property Rights and the GATI: United States Goals 
in the Uruguay Round," (1988) 21 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 367 at 373-375. 
180 Mackley, supra note 153 at 164. 
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POLITICAL FACTORS 
Given the inadequacy in both the current scope of intellectual property 
protection worldwide and in the outlook for reform either through bilateral 
negotiations or through international intellectual property bodies, the new 
GA TI round provides a most logical and promising vehicle for change. 181 
Kenneth W. Dam (IBM Vice President, 
Law and External Relations) 
While the philosophical and economic sections have failed to provide a 
normative explanation for the existence of an international patent system, 
political game theory 182 may provide a positive explanation for why domestic 
patent systems strengthen with economic development and whether it is likely 
that these same pressures will produce an international patent system. Three 
stages of development will be examined in an attempt to formulate a general 
model: a weak innovation national economy, a strong innovation national 
economy, and an international economy containing both weak and strong 
innovation states. 
Weak Innovation Economy 
In the weak innovation economy it is assumed that most technology is 
imported or copied and produced domestically and that industrial interests in the 
innovation sector of the economy are relatively weak. At such a stage of 
development, game theory would predict that a patent system would not likely 
be developed. Economic interests are concentrated in sectors that rely on 
technology generated from other intellectual property systems. These sectors 
are reluctant to pay monopoly premiums for access to the technology or 
information on which it is based. Consequently, it is in their collective interests 
to set up a lobby to convince the government to maintain the existing regime of 
no patent protection. This lobbying behaviour was observed in the 
pharmaceutical industries in France until 1958, Germany until 1968, and Japan 
until 1976. 183 These industries relied largely on externally generated technology 
181 K. W. Dam, "The Growing Importance of International Protection of Intellectual 
Property," (1987), 21 The Int'! Law. 627 at 636. 
182 Game theory was developed by economists such as 1986 Nobel Prize winner James 
Buchanan as a method of assessing the economic behaviour of "rational" actors in 
predicting overall economic development. More recently, it has been expanded to the 
political realm in an attempt to explain political decisions in terms of "rational" voters 
interests and to predict future decisions. An excellent introduction to the political 
dimension of game theory can be found in Iain McLean's Public Choice (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1987). 
183 These are the years in which pharmaceutical patent protection was introduced. See 
UNCTAD, Economic, Commercial and Developmental Aspects, supra note 147 at 29. 
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to generate their profits, and so, lobbied strongly to protect the source of those 
profits - the absence of a patent regime. 
Against these relatively concentrated industrial interests are the interests of 
a weak innovation sector. Some domestic companies may develop their own 
inventive products or make significant modifications to imported inventive 
technology. It would be in their economic interests to have a patent system 
which would protect their innovation in the form of monopoly access to the 
market with their technology. These interests, however, are relatively weak in 
comparison with the technology pirating and using industries. Consequently, 
lobbying of the government is unlikely to pose a significant challenge to the 
status quo of a patent-free economy. 
Application of the game theory model in the weak innovation economy has 
been summarized by Braga as follows: 
Those who have a vested interest in avoiding the reform [of 
the patent system] would tend to lobby forcefully against 
enhanced intellectual property rights protection. The potential 
beneficiaries, in turn, would tend to be much less organized 
and prone to adopt a free-rider attitude in the policy debate. 
As a result, the political support for such a reform may not be 
sufficiently strong to override the opposition. 184 
Thus, game theory predicts that in the low-innovation economy, the non-
innovation interests will win the political debate and no patent system will be 
introduced. 
Strong Innovation Economy 
In the strong innovation economy, the number of innovation industries has 
grown (as they did in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry over the late 1960s 
and early 1970s) to the point where they are a relatively important component of 
the economy. Given the potential gain to these industries of the establishment of 
a patent system, it would be in their rational economic interests to band together 
and fund a lobbying effort to convince the government to introduce such a 
system. More specifically, the gains to each innovating company would be 
relatively high. Consequently, it would be in their interests to contribute to a 
general industry campaign to obtain a patent system as the potential rewards 
would be large for each individual company. 
Allied against this move might be the relatively weak pirating sector and the 
consumer lobby. Given the relatively diverse and often disorganized nature of 
184 Braga, supra note 78 at 262. 
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the pirating industries, their lobby would be unlikely to match the strength of the 
innovation industry lobby. While it may appear that the strongest lobby of all 
would be the consumer lobby, game theory predicts that even if consumers were 
united in their opposition to the perceived higher prices of a patent system, they 
would not likely be successful. The potential losses to each individual consumer 
in the form of monopoly prices are relatively small. Consequently, while they 
might prefer to see a campaign funded to prevent such a system from being 
established, it would not be in their rational interest to contribute to such a 
campaign, given the relatively minor benefit they would deri:ve from it. If each 
individual consumer arrives at this same decision - to act as a free-rider - then 
the consumer lobby will be severely underfunded or not funded at all. Thus, 
game theory would predict that patent systems would be developed more often 
than not in countries with relatively concentrated innovation sectors, even where 
the majority of the population would oppose the development of such a system. 
International Patent System 
When moving to the international system, a key pressure that is added is the 
potential lobbying of other governments. This lobbying has two avenues of 
impact. The first is directly on the government that is making a decision on 
whether or not to have a patent system or the strength thereof. The second is on 
industries that perceive the foreign government as willing to utilize trade 
sanctions that might hurt those industries and that, in turn, lobby their 
governments to establish a patent regime. 
Evidence of the importance of this international pressure can be found in the 
decision of Korea to strengthen its intellectual property legislation in response to 
American trade threats. In November 1985, the United States Trade 
Representative initiated an investigation of Korea's lack of intellectual property 
rights. The Korean government, backed by industry that was fearful of 
generalized American trade sanctions, quickly agreed to establish a 
comprehensive intellectual property system in an agreement with the American 
President in July 1986.185 Thus, for those countries that are susceptible to the 
trade leverage of innovation intensive economies, it is likely that they will be 
pressured into accepting changes in their intellectual property rights. 186 
185 See S. R. Phillips, "The New Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988: Trade Wars or Open Markets?" (1989) 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 491 at 576. 
!86 Further examples of this trend can be found in the recent decisions of Taiwan, 
Singapore, Mexico and Brazil to significantly improve their intellectual property systems 
(including the patent component of them). The decision of Brazil is particularly 
important given its traditional role as one of the leaders of the weak patent movement in 
the developing world. Hunnicutt notes that Turkey has also given indications of a 
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Although individual countries may be pressured to establish patent rights, 
this would not leave us with a unified international patent system. Game theory, 
however, can also be used in predicting a probable outcome of the current push 
by developed countries to establish such a system in the GA TT negotiations. 
The GATT and the Establishment of a Global Patent System 
As was outlined in the historical background section, the United States and 
other leading innovation-intensive economies187 appear to be abandoning 
existing international intellectual property forums such as WIP0188 in an effort 
to attain the goal of an intellectual property system that would include an 
international patent. This shift is consistent with the American view that 
inadequate patent protection is not a justifiable exercise of domestic policy 
determination but a conscious barrier to trade that must be eliminated. 
The choice of the GA TT forum is not random. Its use is a conscious 
abandonment by the United States of the existing mechanisms controlled by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization. Rather than bargain in a forum where 
the United States has little support and even less leverage, the American 
government has chosen to push for an international patent system in an 
organization where they remain the dominant player. American decisions on 
whether to open their markets to developing countries will be critical to 
determining those countries' levels of development in the post-Marxist, free 
enterprise world. Consequently, these countries will be reluctant to risk losing 
favoured trade status by opposing American pressures for the establishment of 
an international patent system. 
As has already been noted, leading countries within the anti-international 
patent bloc such as Mexico have already altered their systems in response to 
American pressure. In the face of more generalized pressure by other leading 
innovation exporters, it seems probable that agreement will be reached on the 
establishment of an international patent system under the GATT. 
Conclusion 
Although game theory cannot provide a normative explanation of whether 
willingness to modify their intellectual property systems in the pursuit of trade benefits. 
See supra, note 33 at 305. 
187 See supra note 83 and related text. 
!88 Kunz-Hallstein has argued that the combination of a strengthened WIPO and the right 
of reprisal under customary international law could be used in the development of an 
international patent system within existing WIPO structural mechanisms. See supra note 
27. 
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or not to establish an international patent system, it does provide a positive 
theory that predicts the establishment of such a system. The collapse of the 
alternate Marxist economic system has left developing countries even more 
susceptible to the pressures of innovation-intensive economies. Consequently, 
we are likely to see the establishment of an international patent regime under the 
auspices of the GA TT. 
CONCLUSION 
The deliberate adoption of this economic policy [an international patent 
system] can be justified on economic grounds only if the gains that accrue 
to society from it exceed the costs incurred because of it. It is indeed 
awkward that the costs cannot be measured nor the gains counted. As a 
result the optimal limits on the patent system, whether with respect to 
time, space, patentability or restrictions on the use of the grant, must 
always remain a subject of controversy.1s9 
Edith Penrose 
When acting in the role of legal practitioner, lawyers have a responsibility to 
engage in positive interpretations of existing law. In recommending the 
establishment of a new system of rules, however, the lawyer must move beyond 
positive law and include normative considerations that set out the philosophical, 
economic, and political bases of the law. Given the major stresses felt by the 
existing international patent mechanisms under the Paris Convention, a new 
legal structure is likely to be created. Thus, in determining the form of this new 
structure, it is critical that lawyers recommend a system of rules that reflects the 
interests of the community it is to serve. 
An examination of the philosophical justifications of an international patent 
system reveals two possible strands of thought. The first is a moral imperative 
of patent rights that would dictate patents of unlimited duration in order to meet 
the inventor's natural rights to the fruits of their labour. Given that no patent 
system in the world has accepted unlimited rights, it appears that moral 
imperative thinking is not deemed to be in the interests of any of the 
communities the international patent law would be serving. All remaining 
philosophical justifications for patents are rooted in assumptions about the 
economic efficiency of such a system. Thus, lawyers must examine the validity 
of these economic justifications. 
Unfortunately, as Penrose notes, most of the variables are impossible to 
quantify on the basis of current economic knowledge. Thus, any justification or 
opposition to an international patent system is fundamentally flawed in that it is 
189 Penrose, supra note 117 at 225. 
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grounded in insufficient economic data. Rather than pressing ahead with GATT 
negotiations on the length of priority periods, the scope of patent protection or 
the criteria for non-use, the legal community should be encouraging further 
research into the underpinnings of an international patent system so that it would 
be possible to make an attempt at determining whether such a system would be 
in the economic interests of the community it serves. Unlike many legal debates 
that are grounded in fundamental and arguably irreconcilable philosophical 
differences, most major players agree on the economic terms of the patent 
debate. Without further study to evaluate those terms, it would be irresponsible 
to recommend for or against the development of an international patent system. 
Unfortunately, international political events are overtaking rational 
calculations of whether an international patent system would serve the interests 
of the global community. Given the relatively concentrated gains accruing to 
innovation-intensive corporations, leading industrial countries have mounted a 
concerted campaign to enshrine intellectual property rights, including patent 
rights, in the Uruguay round of the GATT. Given the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and corresponding inability of developing nations to turn for assistance to 
institutions other than the market-oriented International Monetary Fund, they 
will have little choice but to conform to the wishes of the industrial powers or 
face possible exclusion from GA TT trade preferences. 
This is not to conclude that the establishment of such a system will 
necessarily have a detrimental impact on developing nations. Indeed, it is 
possible that they will obtain considerable long-term benefits from participation 
in an international patent system. Laws should not be recommended, however, 
on the basis of blind possibilities. Their impact on the various sectors of the 
community they serve should be carefully measured. On the basis of our 
existing knowledge, we cannot make such a measurement. Consequently, it 
would be unconscionable to pressure countries to modify their patent regimes to 
an international standard. Until a normative basis for an international patent 
system is found, Alice's White Knight should be left to invent on his own and 
should not expect international patent protection. 
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APPENDIX- Variables Utilized 
A = Economic activities from investment (human and capital) in inventions 
under a patent system 
B = Economic activities from investment (human and capital) in inventions that 
are not based on economic rewards 
C = Economic activity derived from knowledge available under a patent system 
D =Economic activity derived from knowledge that would be present 
regardless of the patent system 
Total Benefits (TB) = (A-B) + (C-D). 
E = Administration costs 
Direct ("legitimate" consequences of monopoly power) 
F =Underutilization of inventions otherwise available 
G =Research expenditures devoted to "Inventing around" 
H =Overallocation in applied research 
Indirect (mitigable consequence of abuse of monopoly power) 
I= Non-use 
J=Contractual abuse of monopoly power 
Total Costs (TC)= (E+F+G+H) + (I+J) * 
* Apply only where there is no legislation to prevent them 
K = Misallocation of inventive resources due to a common patent protection 
period 
L = Net flow of patented goods 
M =Net flow of investment in patent research 
N =Net flow of dividends 
0 =Direct technology gains from increased access to patents 
Aw=Economic activities from internal investment in inventions given access to a 
global market 
Cw=Advances made as a result to access to knowledge obtained from patent 
information around the world 
Total Global Benefits: (A1-B1)+(C1-D1)+(01)+(Aw1+Cw1) 
Total Global Costs: (E1-Ew)+(F1+G1+Hi)+(I1+J1)+(K1)+(Kw) 
Where 1 is the sum of the variables of all the countries and (!1+11) are mitigable through 
legislation. 
